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It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: 
A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996 
Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation 
Jessica A. Roth* 
Introduction 
In the summer of 1996, Congress enacted a series of restrictions on 
the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") 1 to prevent recipients of LSC 
funds ftom engaging in political action.2 The restrictions prohibit LSC 
recipients from supporting litigation aimed at redistricting, 3 at influencing 
or challenging any executive order or agency action at any level of gov-
ernment,4 or at encouraging individuals to participate in political activity.5 
LSC recipients are also prohibited from participating in any litigation with 
respect to abortion;6 assisting any persons incarcerated in federal, state, 
or local prison;7 assisting any illegal aliens;8 and assisting any person 
charged with the illegal sale or use of drugs in a proceeding seeking to 
evict them from public housing.9 In addition, LSC recipients may not seek 
to reform any federal or state welfare system through litigation, lobbying, 
or rulemaking; 10 participate in any class actions; 11 sue the Legal Services 
Corporation; 12 or request attorneys' fees, even where provided for by 
• Law clerk to the Honorable Denise Cote, Southern District of New York. A.B., 
Harvard College, 1992; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997. The author wishes to thank Burt 
Neuborne and Frederick Schauer for their advice and encouragement. 
1 A national legal services program was first created in 1965 as part of the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964. See generally Warren E. George, Development of the Legal 
Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 682 (1976). The Legal Services Corpo-
ration Act of 1974 is the governing statute of the LSC. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)). 
2 The restrictions were incorporated into the appropriations bill, the Omnibus Consoli-
dated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 ("OCRAA''), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 
Stat. 1321. 
3 See OCRAA § 504(a)(l) . 
4 See id. § 504(a)(2). 
5 See id. § 504(a)(l2). 
6 See id. § 504(a)(l4). 
1 See id. § 504(a)(l5). 
s See id. § 504(a)(l l). 
9 See id. § 504(a)(l7). 
10 See id. § 504(a)(l6). 
11 See id. § 504(a)(7). 
12 See id. § 506. 
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federal or state law. 13 These restrictions, as originally enacted, applied not 
only to the use of LSC funds, but also to funds received from any other 
source. 14 
Although the LSC mandate has never been free of restrictions, 15 the 
1996 amendments represent Congress's most comprehensive effort to date 
to remove disfavored subjects from the purview of LSC lawyers. Enacted 
after a heated debate between supporters and opponents of the LSC in 
Congress, 16 the restrictions have been described as a compromise between 
those who would eliminate the Corporation entirely due to its "liberal" 
bent and those who would save it at all costs. 17 Despite the new restric-
tions, 18 many LSC lawyers and their supporters breathed a sigh of relief 
at their narrow escape from total "de-funding." Just as LSC recipients 
have historically been reluctant to challenge the legality of the restrictions 
imposed on them, 19 today's LSC lawyers and supporters have largely 
13See id. § 504(a)(l3). 
14 See id. § 504(d)(l). In response to several court rulings finding the restriction on 
non-federal funds constitutionally suspect, the LSC revised its regulations concerning the 
use of non-federal funds . See 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1996) (permitting LSC grantees to use 
non-federal funds for prohibited activities provided that the funds and facilities used to 
undertake these activities are segregated from federal funds). 
15 The first LSC statute prohibited recipients from engaging in litigation relating to 
abortion, desegregation, selective service and military desertion cases, and criminal 
proceedings. Participation in class actions was only permitted if the individual lawyers 
received approval from their program superiors. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(b)(7)-(10) 
(1994). See generally Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the 
Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734, 736-39 (1976) . The 1974 
statute also placed severe restrictions on the ability of LSC lawyers to engage in political 
activities on their own time as well as in their representative capacities, and forbade LSC 
offices from becoming involved in any form of political organizing or lobbying efforts. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(a)(6)(A), (e)(b)(5) (1994). 
16 See 142 CONG. REC. H81490-550, H81590-92 (daily ed. July 23, 1996). 
17 See David E. Rovella, Legal Aid Lawyers Roll Dice with New Lawsuit, NAT' L L.J., 
Feb. 19, 1997, at A6 (describing Ken Boehm, former counsel to the LSC board, as 
characterizing the outcome as "a deal with moderate congressional Republicans last 
summer, allowing the new funding restrictions in exchange for a smaller LSC budget 
reduction ... [t]here really was a quid pro quo .... "). 
18 The LSC budget was cut to $278 million in 1996, a one-third reduction from its 
previous budget. See David E. Rovella, Will Court Win Spur GOP Backlash?, NAT'L L.J., 
Jan. 13, 1997, at Al. 
19 In the over two decades since the LSC was created, the majority of the restrictions 
imposed on funding recipients, including the bans on abortion and desegregation cases, 
have never been challenged. See Note, The Constitutionality of Excluding Desegregation 
from the Legal Services Program, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1630 (1984). One notable 
exception to this general reluctance to bring suit is the 1991 challenge to the redistricting 
restrictions brought in Texas Rural Legal Aid Inc., v. Legal Servs. Corp. , 940 F.2d 685 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("TRLA" ). In TRLA, although the plaintiff LSC lawyers argued that the 
LSC had exceeded its authority by prohibiting redistricting litigation and that the regula-
tions violated their First Amendment rights, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia reached only the former issue. The court found the LSC to 
be within its statutory authority. See id. The other exception to the reluctance trend was 
brought in 1975 immediately after the LSC's creation. The suit challenged one of the 
original restrictions that prohibited LSC employees from participating in, or encouraging 
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declined to challenge the most recent restrictions. Faced with the choice 
between limited funding and no funding at all, the cautious view ration-
ally counsels against upsetting Congress and jeopardizing the future ex-
istence of the LSC. 20 
A few renegade LSC lawyers have resisted this view. Convinced that 
the "LSC is caving into budgetary blackmail,"21 and that "it's better to 
hang than to compromise,"22 these lawyers challenge the assumption that 
the so-called "compromise" represented by the restrictions will ultimately 
save the Corporation.23 These lawyers have taken the LSC to court.24 In 
three lawsuits filed nationally, the lawyers have challenged the restrictions 
on First Amendment grounds of free speech and association, and Fifth 
Amendment grounds of equal protection and due process.25 Thus far, the 
lawsuits have had varying degrees of success. One state court held the 
class action restriction to be flatly unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment as applied to non-federal funds. 26 A federal court found specific 
others to participate in, public demonstrations, boycotts, or strikes, on the grounds that 
the restriction violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of the LSC grantees, the 
lawyers, and their clients. See Welfare Rights Org. v. Cramton, Civil No. 75-1938 (D.D.C., 
filed Nov. 20, 1975) (unpublished material) cited in Note, supra note 15, at 737 n.17. 
20 Outgoing LSC President Alexander D. Forger observed of Burt Neuborne, the NYU 
law professor who is representing several LSC lawyers challenging the restrictions, "[he] 
has the luxury of playing Russian roulette," while LSC officials must face the reality of 
total defunding. Rovella, supra note 18, at Al. See also David E. Rovella, LSC Invites 
Law Firms to the Legal Services Game, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at AS ("The LSC has 
scolded grantees for thumbing their noses at Congress by continuing to pursue class 
actions."); Rovella, supra note 17, at A6 (quoting Ken Boehm, former LSC counsel, as 
saying, if those currently challenging the restrictions "are successful with this lawsuit, they 
will pull the rug out from under their supporters in Congress"). 
21 Rovella, supra note 17, at A6. 
22 Rovella, supra note 18, at Al. 
23 Valerie J. Bogart, one of the lawyers who has challenged the restrictions, argues 
that "placating LSC opponents is pointless, since 'no understanding exists' between the 
LSC and Republicans who seek the agency's elimination. '[The LSC] keeps saying there 
is a contract with Congress . . . . There is no contract. The first thing out of this new 
Congress will be to zero us out."' Id. 
24 The three lawsuits that have been filed are: Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., Civil No. 97-00032 
(D. Hawaii Feb. 14, 1997); Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., Civil No. 97-00182 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 14, 1997). 
25 The Varshavsky case challenged the restrictions on the additional ground that they 
conflicted with the New York State Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was 
framed as a conditional motion to withdraw by Valerie Bogart, the LSC lawyer who had 
served as counsel for a certified plaintiff class in a class action against the New York 
Department of Social Services. Following a preliminary injunction against the Department 
of Social Services, Ms. Bogart had been involved in monitoring the Department's compli-
ance. She asked the court to clarify whether the new LSC restrictions required her to 
withdraw from her involvement in that case. Ms. Bogart argued that she should not be 
required to withdraw, even if the regulations required it, on account of the fact that the 
regulations were void because they violated the U.S. Constitution and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. See Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 2-3. 
26 See id. at 20-21, holding sections 504(a)(7) (class actions) and 504(d)(l) (applica-
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restrictions, although not the class action restriction, to be unconstitu-
tional as applied to non-federal funds. 27 The third case is still pending in 
district court. 
This Article provides support for the argument, not yet made in court, 
that those restrictions that can be described as political, i.e., those prohib-
iting class actions and any type of political reform effort, are unconstitu-
tional even as applied to the use of federal funds. This argument is a 
difficult one to make in light of the Supreme Court's statement in Rust v. 
Sullivan28 that the government may fund only those activities, including 
speech, which it supports. It also may be a politically imprudent argument 
to advance, since a legal victory on this basis of this argument could result 
in the total elimination of the Legal Services Corporation. Nevertheless, 
the argument is legally sound and is an important one to make from a 
moral and political standpoint. While Congress may choose not to fund 
legal services at all,29 in choosing which legal activities to fund, it may 
not discriminate between legal activities based on their political import. 
Drawing on one of the exceptions that the Court itself carved out in Rust, 
namely, that the existence of a public subsidy does not justify restrictions 
on speech in areas expressly dedicated to speech activity or the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas, this Article argues that the LSC restrictions in 
fact target dangerous ideas within a program expressly dedicated to First 
Amendment activity. 
Part I demonstrates that the types of litigation and political activities 
prohibited by the LSC restrictions are protected by the First Amendment, 
and that the restrictions constitute impermissible content discrimination. 
Part II uses a public forum analysis to argue that in creating the LSC, 
Congress dedicated funds to classic First Amendment activity. Accord-
ingly, any restrictions on the use of funds for particular activities cannot 
be inconsistent with the program's designated purposes. Part III demon-
strates that the restrictions also violate the equal protection component of 
the Due Process Clause. Although the poor are not a suspect class for the 
purposes of equal protection analysis, the regulations are nevertheless 
unconstitutional because they are motivated by invidious bias. In addition, 
tion to non-federal funds) are unconstitutional (but without reaching whether section 
504(a)(7) was unconstitutional as applied only to federal funds). 
27 See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw., No. 97-00032, slip op. at 35-36, holding the following 
provisions of the 1996 Legal Services Corporation Act unconstitutional: § 504(a)(l) (redis-
tricting); § 504(a)(2) (influence of executive orders or agency action); § 504(a)(3) (influence 
of adjudicatory proceeding) ; § 504(a)(4) (comprehensive ban on lobbying); § 504(a)(l2) 
(political organizing or educational activities); § 504(a)(14) (abortion); § 504(a)(15) (repre-
sentation of prisoners); § 504(a)(l 7) (representation of drug defendants in public housing 
evictions). 
28 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
29 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no right to counsel in civil 
cases . See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 562 (1996); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 
2181 (1996); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) . 
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they impair the LSC beneficiaries' fundamental right of access to the 
courts and consequently their ability to participate fully in and enjoy the 
protections of our democratic institutions. 
I. The LSC Restrictions Violate the First Amendment 
A. Litigation Is First Amendment Activity 
1. NAACP v. Button 
The Supreme Court consistently has held that litigation is protected 
activity under the First Amendment. In NAACP v. Button,30 Virginia sought 
to enforce a statute regulating solicitation in the legal business against the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 
The Court found the statute unconstitutional as applied to the NAACP, 
despite the fact that Virginia had a legitimate interest in regulating abuses 
in the legal profession. Recognizing the special role that litigation played 
"[i]n the context of NAACP objectives,"31 the Court held that litigation, 
and especially group litigation, could be "a form of political expression"32 
for those groups, like the black community in the South, "which find 
themselves unable to achieve their goals through the ballot .... "33 For 
them, the Court reasoned, "litigation is not a technique of resolving 
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of 
equality of treatment by all government, federal, state, and local, for the 
members of the Negro community in this country."34 
The Court refused to define precisely where in the penumbra of rights 
protected by the First Amendment the activities practiced by the NAACP 
fell . Rather, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the NAACP 
activities "whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legiti-
mate political ends,"35 could not be subsumed under any one "narrow, 
literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly."36 However 
categorized, such litigation was entitled to the highest level of protec-
tion. 37 Under the current system of government, as Justice Brennan saw 
it, not only was litigation potentially the only practical avenue available 
for a minority to petition for redress of grievances,38 but it was also the 
most effective way to communicate "the distinctive contribution of a 
30 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 




35 Button , 371 U.S . at 430. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 433. 
38 See id. 
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minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society."39 Thus, from the 
standpoint of concerns about political participation and equality, as well 
as about the richness of the marketplace of ideas and the legitimacy of 
our political democracy-both integral to our understanding of the pur-
poses of the First Amendment40-the Virginia statute was destructive of 
constitutional values. 
2. Beyond Button 
In numerous cases since Button, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
and expanded its central holding that litigation is protected by the First 
Amendment. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 41 United 
Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Association,42 and United 
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan,43 the Court found, respec-
tively, First Amendment protection for a railroad workers' union's attempt 
to provide its members with legal referrals for personal injury suits; a 
miners' union's effort to hire an attorney on a salaried basis to assist 
members with workmen's compensation claims; and a transportation un-
ion's attempt to secure competent counsel at reasonable fees for its mem-
bers pursuing claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Restat-
ing the principle that had emerged from the collective action cases following 
Button, Justice Black wrote for the Court in United Transportation Union: 
"[t]he common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, 
Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken 
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within 
the protection of the First Amendment."44 
Whereas Button, viewed narrowly, may have suggested that only 
litigation undertaken specifically for a political purpose was entitled to 
First Amendment protection, the union cases that followed made clear that 
litigation undertaken for any purpose was protected. As the Court stated 
in Trainmen, "[t]he Brotherhood's activities fall just as clearly within the 
protection of the First Amendment [as the activities at issue in Button] 
.... [T]he Constitution protects the associational rights of the members 
of the union precisely as it does those of the NAACP."45 In fact, the 
39 Id. 
4° Kenneth L. Karst has described three purposes, "not always distinct in practice," 
which are commonly identified as central to the First Amendment as follows : "(I) to 
permit informed choices by citizens in a self-governing democracy, (2) to aid in the search 
for truth, and (3) to permit each person to develop and exercise his or her capacities, thus 
promoting the sense of individual self-worth." Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 (1975). 
41 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
42 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
43 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 
44 Id. at 585. 
45 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. I, at 8. 
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majority in Trainmen specifically rejected the dissent's view that the vital 
fact about Button was that litigation "was a 'form of political expression' 
to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights."46 
Where no such civil rights were at issue, as in Trainmen, the dissent 
argued Button was "not apposite."47 Again, in United Mine Workers, the 
Court clarified, "the First Amendment does not protect speech and assem-
bly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular 
causes, with small ones, are guarded."'48 
In re Primus49 reiterated the Button holding in a case more closely 
analogous to Button's original facts. In Primus, the Court extended First 
Amendment protection to a South Carolina lawyer who had solicited a 
prospective litigant for representation by the ACLU. Finding that "the 
ACLU's policy of requesting an award of counsel fees does not take this 
case outside of the protection of Button," 50 the Court held that the ACLU, 
like the NAACP, engaged in litigation as "'a form of political expression' 
and 'political association."'51 As in Button, the lawyer's actions on behalf 
of the ACLU were found to be protected. While states may regulate 
lawyers' activities, the Court held, they may do so only with "narrow 
specificity." 52 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the most exacting 
scrutiny should be applied to limitations on core First Amendment rights.53 
Because South Carolina's action in punishing the ACLU lawyer failed 
such strict scrutiny, it was held unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.54 
3. Group versus Individual Litigation 
Button and its progeny established that group litigation, whether under-
taken for overtly political reasons or merely to secure more meaningful 
access to the courts, is protected by the First Amendment. Class actions, 
the most recent procedural device invented to bring group litigation,55 fall 
within the protections of Button. Insofar as litigation always involves 
46 Id. at 10 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. 
48 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) 
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)). 
49 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
50 Id. at 429. 
51 Id. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)). 
52 Primus, 436 U.S. at 433 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433). 
53 See Primus, 436 U.S. at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 44-45 (1976)). 
54 Primus, 436 U.S. at 439. 
55 Class actions, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, did not exist prior 
to the revision of the federal rules in 1966. Prior to the 1966 revision, claims in which 
many persons were interested could be brought under Federal Equity Rule 38, which dated 
to 1912. Federal Equity Rule 38 provided: "When the question is one of common or 
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracti-
cable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." 
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association and speech between the lawyer and his or her client, individ-
ual cases are also covered by the large shadow cast by Button. As dem-
onstrated by the cases following Button, which involved actions taken one 
at a time on behalf of individual clients, one need not petition the court 
as a member of a group in order to enjoy the protections of the First 
Amendment. While First Amendment concerns may be at their zenith 
where an oppressed minority joins in asserting a political claim, these 
concerns are nevertheless present even when an individual litigant ad-
vances a small, non-political cause. 
B. The Restrictions Constitute Impermissible Content Discrimination 
1. Content-Based Discrimination against Speech Is Impermissible 
a. The Classic Statement: Mosley and Core Political Speech 
In the hierarchy of speech contemplated by the First Amendment, 
political speech "occupies the highest, most protected position."56 Although 
the outer limits of political speech are imprecise, 57 if there is one broad 
category that is always considered political, it is speech overtly addressing 
government policy or the acts of particular public officials.58 
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933), quoted in Arthur R. Miller, 
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action 
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REY. 664, 669 n.24 (1979). 
56 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring) . 
Commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of 
second-class expression. Finally, "obscenity and fighting words," fill out the lowest tier, 
receiving "the least protection of all ." Id. 
57 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils 
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 1 (1990) (discussing 
the Court's attempts to define "matters of public concern"). 
Speech that does not overtly touch on government policy, but rather expresses a particular 
world view or perspective on people and events, is also frequently considered political speech. 
For example, art is often political in the sense that it implicitly critiques certain policies or 
offers alternative perspectives. Speech concerning race and religion is frequently political as 
well, in the sense that views on these subjects inform views about how society should be 
structured. The line defining where art, for example, turns into obscenity ( or where it ceases 
to be mere entertainment and takes on a political hue), and where expressions on race 
cross over into fighting words, is inexact. The Court therefore has tended to overestimate 
the political value of speech, affording it more protection than it may warrant according 
to a more literal interpretation of "political" speech. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive 
for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda 
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."). See also 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (recognizing the political value of even 
indecent parodies of public figures); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); cf Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding certain pornographic brochures sufficiently 
lacking in "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" to warrant regulation). 
58 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (invoking our nation 's 
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Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley59 posed the question of 
whether a city could single out one type of political speech, peaceful labor 
picketing, for exclusion from a general ban on picketing within 150 feet 
of any school. The Supreme Court held that it could not. The distinction 
made by the City of Chicago, in the Court's view, represented the very 
essence of content discrimination: it impermissibly privileged one subject 
area of speech-labor disputes-over other subject areas of speech, such 
as racial discrimination. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, invoked 
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
First Amendment in his classic formulation of the general prohibition 
against content discrimination: 
[G]ovemment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to 
express less favored or more controversial views . . . . There is 
an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must 
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.60 
The Court has applied Mosley in other contexts to hold that a rule 
prohibiting any discussion of matters of public policy or politics may 
constitute impermissible content discrimination. In Consolidated Edison 
v. Public Service Commission of New York, 61 the Supreme Court held that 
New York's Public Service Commission could not suppress bill inserts 
discussing controversial issues of public policy. Reiterating its view that 
"the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not 
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic,"62 the Court invalidated the Commis-
sion's action. Although the utility's bill inserts could be regulated pursu-
ant to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that were neutral as 
to content, the Court found that the Commission's stated rationale63 did 
not justify the restrictions. The Court found that the Commission had 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"). See also 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 421 ("Speech about public officials or matters of public concern 
receives greater protection than speech about other topics."); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
59 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
60 Id. at 96 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE, 27 (1948)). 
61 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
62 Id. at 537. 
63 The Commission argued that it was concerned that allowing the inserts would: 
(I) force Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience; (2) prevent the allocation of 
limited resources in a way better designed to serve the public interest; and (3) force the 
ratepayers to subsidize the cost of the insert. See id. at 540-41. 
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singled out "certain bill inserts precisely because they address controver-
sial issues of public policy"64 and that this restriction on the free speech 
of private parties65 was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state inter-
est. 
In Boos v. Barry,66 the Court similarly held that a local ordinance 
prohibiting the display of signs critical of foreign governments near their 
embassies constituted impermissible content · discrimination. Observing 
that the ordinance "operates at the core of the First Amendment by 
prohibiting petitioners from engaging in classically political speech,"67 the 
Court determined that the ordinance was suspect because it kept an "entire 
category of speech"68 off the streets. Because this ordinance, like the one 
in Consolidated Edison, was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest, it was struck down. Mosley, Consolidated Edison, 
and Boos thus stand for the proposition that a regulation that singles out 
political speech for prohibition is highly suspect. For the regulation to be 
sustained in either the public forum context of the streets, such as in 
Mosley or Boos, or the private context, such as in Consolidated Edison, 
the state must present a compelling interest justifying the restriction. It 
must further demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. 69 
b. The Recent Statement: R.A.V. and Hate Speech 
Even when the content of speech is not protected by the First Amend-
ment,70 the Supreme Court has long held that the state cannot discriminate 
64 Id. at 537. 
65 Although Consolidated Edison is a regulated utility, the Court found that it was a 
private party for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, and that the bills sent by the 
utility represented private, commercial speech. See id. at 534 n. l; see also id. at 539-40 
("Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the Commission as a forum from 
which to promulgate its views. Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes 
to promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy."). See Part 11.B.3, infra, 
for an extensive discussion of the significance of the nature of the forum. 
66 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
67 /d. at 318. 
68 Id. at 319. 
69 There have been occasional narrow exceptions to the general prohibition against 
subject-matter prohibitions. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), cited by 
the Court in Consolidated Edison, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting any political 
advertising on public buses. There, the Court found that the city's stated interests-"fears 
that partisan advertisements might jeopardize long-term commercial revenue, that com-
muters would be subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of particular 
political advertisements might lead to charges of favoritism," Consolidated Edison, 447 
U.S. 530, 539-were sufficiently compelling and that the rule was sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. 
70 The Supreme Court has historically held that a few select areas of speech are "not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech" because they are "of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
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between speakers based on the content of their speech.71 In R.A. V. v. City 
of St. Paul,72 one of the most recent statements of this rule, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a local ordinance making bias-motivated disorderly conduct 
a crime subject to more severe punishment than "ordinary" disorderly conduct. 
The Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that the ordi-
nance reached only "'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky," 73 
and that the speech was therefore proscribable. Nevertheless, the Court found 
the ordinance "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise per-
mitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."74 
Although the types of expressive conduct forbidden by the ordinance 
(such as placing a swastika or a burning cross on public or private property)75 
could have been prohibited under more general trespass or disorderly 
conduct laws, the Court was disturbed by the fact that only speech asso-
ciated with specific subjects and certain viewpoints was singled out for 
the prohibition.76 Those wishing "to use 'fighting words' in connection 
with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of politi-
cal affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality,"77 were not penal-
ized, while those wishing to express themselves, albeit virulently, on the 
subject of "race, color, creed, religion, or gender"78 were. However noble 
the city's motives, the Court concluded that "the First Amendment does 
not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who 
express views on disfavored subjects."79 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, at 383 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity) and 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S . 568 (1942) (fighting words)). See also Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation). While these areas are sometimes 
described as "unprotected" by the First Amendment, the Court has also taken pains to 
point out that they are not "invisible" to it. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383. Thus, while these 
types of speech may "be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content 
... they may [not] be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383-84. 
71 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S . 92 (1972). See generally Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983); Susan 
H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 
(1991). 
72 505 U.S. 377 (1991). 
73 Id. at 381 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) 
(establishing fighting words doctrine and defining fighting words as "those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"). 
74 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 381. 
75 See id. at 380, describing the St. Paul ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE 
§ 292.02 (1990). 
76 505 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, 
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Within the subjects covered by the ordinance, Justice Scalia, writing 
for the plurality, found that one viewpoint, espousing white supremacy,80 
was handicapped. While displays containing some words-odious racial 
epithets-for example, would be prohibited to proponents of all views, 
fighting words not invoking race, color, creed, religion, or gender-cast-
ing aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-seemingly would be 
usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial 
tolerance and equality. 81 Yet, such fighting words could not be used by 
those speakers' opponents.82 Justice Scalia concluded that this scheme 
impermissibly "license[d] one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules."83 The St. 
Paul ordinance thus went beyond mere subject discrimination to the more 
insidious viewpoint discrimination, privileging the proponents of toler-
ance over those unimpressed with its virtues. 
2. The LSC Restrictions Constitute Subject Matter as well as 
Viewpoint Discrimination 
a. The Restrictions Discriminate against All Political Speech 
Taken as a whole, the restrictions on LSC recipients enacted in 1996 are 
far broader than the restrictions on political speech presented in Mosley or 
Boos. The LSC restrictions prevent recipients from engaging in any First 
Amendment activity touching on political matters. LSC recipients, regardless 
of the subject matter, may no longer participate in class actions84 or petition 
local or federal agencies for a change in administrative rules.85 They may 
not counsel individual clients to participate on their own in political 
activity nor may they advocate a particular public policy.86 The restric-
tions, in short, seek to remove the LSC entirely from the political arena. 
The members of Congress who passed these restrictions were quite 
purposeful about this result. As one proponent of LSC stated, seeking to 
appease his more conservative colleagues, "the following restrictions are 
in place: No class action suits by LSC, no lobbying, no legal assistance 
to illegal aliens, no political activities, no prisoner litigation, no redistrict-
ing litigation, no representation of people evicted from public housing due 
to drugs. That's all in the past."87 The LSC that emerged from the 1996 
80 See id. at 392. 
8 1 See id. at 391. 
82 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391. 
83 Id. at 392. 
84 See OCRAA § 504(a)(7) . 
85 See id. § 504(a)(16). 
86 See id. § 504(a)(l 2). 
87 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8180 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad) . 
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budget debate was self-consciously stripped of its ability to participate in 
any such political activities. It was reduced to doing "ham and eggs work 
for poor people," not the "sexier lawsuit . . . the class action suits ... 
that draw headlines."88 
Regardless of the motive of Congress, 89 the restrictions on the LSC 
clearly fall within the paradigm of political subject matter discrimination 
prohibited by Mosley, Consolidated Edison, and Boos. The fact that the 
subject matter they restrict is so broad-i.e., all political speech-does 
not weaken the discriminatory nature of the prohibition. As in Consoli-
dated Edison, where the prohibition applied to all controversial issues of 
public policy, the breadth of the prohibition only heightens the pressure 
on the government to advance a compelling interest served by such a rule. 
b. The Restrictions Handicap a Particular Political Viewpoint 
In addition to prohibiting all political activities, the LSC restrictions 
particularly handicap the political viewpoint generally associated with the 
population served by LSC recipients-the poor. If the poor and those who 
advocate their interests have a particular political viewpoint, it is arguably 
one that supports a more generous welfare state. This view has been typed 
"liberal" in the contemporary political debate, contrasted with the "conservative" 
view that advocates smaller government and less redistri butive taxation.90 
The viewpoint of the poor is not necessarily limited to advocating for 
greater government largesse, however. The agenda pursued by legal ad-
vocates for the poor may rather be one seeking to hold the government 
accountable for infringements of substantive rights already afforded by 
law. This goal, like the goal of increasing poor people's substantive rights, 
may be described as seeking political change from a non-responsive status 
quo91 to a state wherein the government lives up to its obligations. This 
is not, however, equivalent to a change in the underlying law. 
88 See id. 
89 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
90 See 142 CONG. REC. H8149-O4,8182 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Weldon) ("I have in front of me a whole list . . . of examples of where Legal Services 
Corporation attorneys are engaging in left-wing liberal advocacy and in many cases going 
exactly against the will of the people."). Senator Helms expressed a similar view of the 
LSC in his comments during the 1995 budget debate, describing LSC lawyers as "a cadre 
of liberal lawyers [who] push their social policies down the throats of local governments 
and citizens." 141 CONG. REC. S8948 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
Representative Doolittle stated "the reason a lot of members want to keep [the LSC] is 
because it is an advocacy group for liberal causes." 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8181 
(statement of Rep. Doolittle). 
91 In his dissenting opinion in Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S . 788 (1985), Justice 
Blackmun implicitly recognized that an "anti-status quo" viewpoint was a viewpoint for 
the purposes of a First Amendment content discrimination analysis. Because advocacy 
groups such as the NAACP were kept out of a Combined Federal Campaign Fund available 
to federal workers, Justice Blackmun concluded, "employees may hear only from those 
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One member of Congress understood "some apartment owners, some 
growers, [and] some government officials"92 to fear this viewpoint "be-
cause they do not want to afford the rights that the law gives."93 The belief 
that government and employers should be held accountable for their vio-
lations of law is a "viewpoint" that is fundamentally threatening to those 
in power. It is a viewpoint generally associated with the population served 
by the LSC, by virtue of the fact that they are poor and often receive 
government assistance that is less than satisfactory. 
While this viewpoint may be widely shared by advocates for the poor, 
it is not limited to that population. Numerous groups over time have 
advocated the view that government should live up to its promises to its 
own citizens. As Harry Kalven wrote of the civil rights era, the efforts of 
the NAACP in the 1950s and 1960s were best characterized as "a strategy 
to trap democracy in its own decencies."94 Although the civil rights move-
ment ultimately resulted in a change in the substantive law represented 
by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, the early stages of the movement focused on litigation that 
would "bring[] to light" the rights of blacks that "in an important sense 
were always there."95 The women's movement similarly used a strategy 
of targeted litigation to improve the enforcement of women's rights. By 
bringing well-timed cases under existing law,96 the advocates of women's 
equality created a "forced feeding of legal growth," and accelerated the 
evolution of "legal doctrine defining [their] rights."97 
charities that think that charitable goals can best be achieved within the confines of 
existing social policy and the status quo. The distinction is blatantly viewpoint based ... . " 
Id. at 833 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has also found white supremacy 
to constitute a viewpoint for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. See supra text 
accompanying notes 80-82; R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). It has also held that 
a religious viewpoint is a viewpoint against which the state may not discriminate. See 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1995) 
("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides . . . a specific premise, a 
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and consid-
ered."). If perspectives as broad and amorphous as "white supremacy" and "religion" may 
be described as viewpoints, "anti-status quo" is arguably a viewpoint as well. 
92 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8183 (statement of Rep. Berman). 
93 Id. 
94 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 ( 1965). 
95 Id. While many of the most significant advances were made through targeted 
litigation, the civil rights movement also utilized other legally protected means to advance 
its cause. The sit-ins and marches staged throughout the South strategically invoked 
numerous constitutional rights, albeit in a defensive posture, and often forced courts to 
assert their protected status as well. See, e.g. , Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) 
(holding that participants in lunch counter sit-ins were protected by First and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
96 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971). 
97 KALVEN, supra note 94, at 66-67. Kalven originated this concept in the context of 
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The LSC restrictions handicap a viewpoint that, like its predecessors in 
the civil rights and women's rights movements, petitions the government 
for change. Whether it leads LSC recipients to ask for a change in the 
substantive law, as prohibited by the restrictions on lobbying, or a change 
in the application or interpretation of existing law, as prohibited indirectly 
by the restrictions on class actions, this viewpoint challenges government 
officials to respect their clients and to honor the law. It is a viewpoint that 
public officials, ranging from Social Security Administration employers 
to members of Congress, would often rather not hear. It is the kind of 
classically unpopular, dissident viewpoint that government officials have 
historically attempted to suppress,98 and that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan,99 
the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people ... that government may be responsive to the will of the people 
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means."100 The constituency 
to whom the government must be responsive includes those holding mi-
nority viewpoints. If the government could silence speakers critical of its 
policies and the status quo, this nation would not have "uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open" 101 debate to which it has been nearly perfectly 
committed since its founding. 
the civil rights movement. It is, however, equally applicable to the women's civil rights 
movement. 
98 The Sedition Act of 1798 represents the most egregious attempt in our national 
history by Congress to insulate itself from criticism. The Act made it a criminal offense 
to: 
write, print, utter or publish . . . any false scandalous and malicious writings 
against the government of the United States or either House of the Congress ... 
or the President . . . with intent to defame the said government . .. or to bring 
them .. . into contempt, or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the hatred of 
the good people of the United States . .. . 
1 Stat. 596 (1798), cited in KALVEN, supra note 94, at 17. The act expired by its own 
terms two years after its enactment. Although the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was 
never tested, "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964). As analyzed by Harry Kalven, the 
Sedition Act was remarkable because it represents the only time the United States has had 
a Jaw creating a crime of seditious libel against the government. KALVEN, supra note 94, 
at 17. The existence of such a Jaw is significant, according to Professor Kalven, because 
a "free society is one in which you cannot defame the government." Id. at 16. Thus, to 
the extent that the LSC restrictions represent an attempt by Congress to tread down this 
road once again, they are in poor historical company. 
99 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
100 Id. at 269 (internal citations omitted). 
101 Id. at 270. 
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Viewed in light of Button and the subsequent litigation cases, R.A. V., 
Mosley, Consolidated Edison, Boos, and New York Times, the LSC restric-
tions should be regarded with suspicion. As in Consolidated Edison, the 
restrictions remove all political subjects from the permissible range of 
speech activities by LSC grantees. As in R.A. V., they handicap one par-
ticular, unpopular viewpoint. The LSC restrictions thus constitute both 
subject matter and viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, in light of New 
York Times, the restrictions should be viewed with particularly heightened 
suspicion because the viewpoint singled out for suppression is one that is 
critical of government. 
The LSC's federal funding, however, places this case in a unique 
context. The speakers at issue are not classically private speakers as they 
were in Button, Mosley, Consolidated Edison, Boos, and New York Times. 
Rather, the government here is in the position of funding the speech it 
seeks to regulate. While LSC recipients in specific instances retain the 
characteristics of private entities, in the context of the use of federal 
funds, they are subject to regulation by Congress. Recognizing the Su-
preme Court's announcement in Rust v. Sullivan 102 that as a general rule 
"the Government may choose not to subsidize speech,''103 the following 
Part will explain why, according to its own terms, Rust should not apply 
to the LSC case. 
II. Rust v. Sullivan Distinguished 
A. The General Rule and the Implied Exceptions 
In Rust v. Sullivan, several recipients of family planning funds under 
Title X of the Public Health Services Act challenged regulations prohib-
iting Title X recipients from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and 
activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. The recipi-
ents argued that the regulations constituted impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination by privileging an anti-abortion viewpoint over a pro-abortion 
viewpoint in the context of family planning. They also argued that the 
regulations impaired a woman's constitutional right to seek an abortion 
under Roe v. Wade, 104 and that they impermissibly infringed on the doc-
tor-patient relationship. 
The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments. Citing its pre-
vious decisions in Regan v. Taxation with Representation105 ("TWR") and 
102 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
103 /d. at 200. 
104410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
105 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In TWR, the Court upheld a statute granting a tax exemption 
for lobbying activities undertaken by veterans' organizations, but not for lobbying activi-
ties undertaken by other nonprofit organizations. 
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Maher v. Roe, 106 the Court found that the government does not engage in 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it "selectively fund[s] a 
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public 
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which 
seeks to deal with the problem in another way."107 By casting the provi-
sion of abortion services as an activity rather than a viewpoint, the Court 
found that there was no viewpoint discrimination. Once the issue was 
framed in such a manner, the distinction embodied in the regulations 
could be seen as representing not viewpoint discrimination, but instead 
the government's choice "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the 
other." 108 
Viewed as a choice between activities, the government's decision to 
fund all family planning services other than abortion was thus removed 
entirely from the paradigm of content discrimination and the protection 
of the First Amendment. 109 The Title X recipients' other claims were then 
easily dismissed as well, for, as the Court held in TWR, "a legislature's 
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny."110 The woman's 
right to choose an abortion was therefore not infringed by the govern-
ment's refusal to fund it. 111 
The Court also declined to find that the Title X recipients' right to 
speak about abortion was infringed by the regulations. Because the regu-
lations allowed recipients to use non-federal funds to support the excluded 
services (provided that the facilities and personnel used to pursue them 
were kept separate) the government had not foreclosed the participants' 
ability to exercise their constitutional rights. 112 The fact that the recipients 
would have to go outside of the program to advocate personal or profes-
sional views inconsistent with the goals of the program did not trouble 
the Court. The Court reasoned that Congress, in creating the Title X 
program, had not "expressly dedicated [an area] to speech activity," 113 nor 
106 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Maher, the Court upheld a state welfare regulation 
authorizing payment for services related to childbirth but not for non-therapeutic abortions. 
1o7 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
10s 1d. 
109 As the Court explained the crucial interpretive device in its analysis, "we have here 
not the case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, 
but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech .... " Id. at 
194-95. 
110 TWR, 461 U.S. at 549. 
111 See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S . 490 (1989), cited 
approvingly by the Court in Rust, on this point (holding that the government need not 
remove any obstacles to the exercise of a fundamental right that are not of its own making). 
112 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 ("The Secretary's regulations do not force the Title X 
grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such 
activities separate and distinct from Title X activities."). 
113 /d. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990)). 
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preempted an area "traditionally open to the public for expressive activ-
ity." 114 In short, because family planning could not be described as fun-
damentally a First Amendment activity, the restrictions, including any 
incidental burdens on speech, were permissible. 
Finally, the Court held that the doctor-patient relationship was not 
unduly intruded upon by the regulations because the Title X program did 
not create the expectation of comprehensive medical services in the area 
of family planning. Reviewing the program's legislative history, the Court 
found that abortion services could reasonably be viewed as beyond the 
"scope of the project funded" 115 and could be excluded on that basis. 
According to the Court, the regulations were justified because they were 
consistent with the statute authorizing the Title X program, 116 and because 
patients should have been on notice that the care they received was subject 
to Congressional limitations. 117 
B. The Exceptions Applied to the LSC Case 
Although Rust announced a rule of considerable import to all funding 
cases, its rule is not iron-clad. The Court acknowledged that even though 
the petitioners ' constitutional arguments did "not carry the day" in Rust, 
they nevertheless were not "without some force."' 18 Had the facts of the 
case been different in any of several enumerated ways, the Court recog-
nized that its decision might have come out differently. 
As suggested by the foregoing analysis of the Court's reasoning, the 
outcome may have been different if the regulations had been found to 
target disfavored speech rather than activities; if they had not allowed the 
recipients of Title X funding to engage in the prohibited activities, includ-
ing speech, through the use of non-federal funds; or if the restrictions 
were not reasonably related to the scope and nature of the federal pro-
gram, as seen through the eyes of the program's authorizers and its 
beneficiaries. Most importantly, Rust might have been decided differently 
if the Court had found that the family planning program was expressly 
dedicated to First Amendment activity. 
The following section explores the significance of these implied ex-
ceptions for the LSC case. Specifically, this section focuses on the dis-
tinction between regulations inherently targeting the expressive content of 
speech rather than its non-expressive element and the nature of the federal 
program. 
114 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
115 /d. at 195. 
116 See id. at 187. 
117 See id. at 200. 
118 Rust, 500 U.S. at 191. 
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1. First Amendment Activity Rather than Ordinary Conduct 
In Rust, the Court emphasized that this was not "a case of the Govern-
ment suppressing a dangerous idea, but of a prohibition on a project 
grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the pro-
ject's scope." 119 If the distinction between those activities funded by the 
program and those excluded was fundamentally based on the content of 
speech, the Court would have taken more seriously TWR's admonition 
that it "would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously 
in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas."' 120 If it had viewed the case through this lens, the Court would 
have been forced to consider whether the regulations' distinction between 
abortion and non-abortion related speech was at all "like distinctions 
based on race or national origin." 121 In other words, the Court would have 
confronted the question recurring throughout its First Amendment juris-
prudence: whether the distinction affected by the law was impermissibly 
based on the content of First Amendment activity. 
If the regulations primarily target First Amendment activity, Rust, as 
well as the Court's expressive conduct cases, 122 suggests that they should 
be subjected to strict scrutiny, especially if they target "dangerous ideas." 
If they represent a choice by Congress to fund only select activities, and 
thereby incidentally burden speech related to excluded activities, then 
they fall under Rust's permissive standard. 123 
In United States v. 0 'Brien, 124 the Court designed a four-part test to 
determine whether regulations permissibly burden speech where speech 
11 9 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120 TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S . 498, 513 
(1959)). 
12 1 Id. 
122 See, e.g. , Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S . 288 (1984) 
(upholding a National Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping in public parks even 
as applied to individuals protesting the plight of the homeless); United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the conviction of an individual who burned his draft card 
despite the possibly expressive nature of the act) . Cf Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 
58 (1970) (invalidating the conviction of an individual who engaged in the unauthorized 
use of a military uniform in a theatrical production tending to discredit the armed forces); 
Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S . 503 (1969) (invalidating 
suspension of high school students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down a statute punishing those who 
expressed their opposition to organized government by displaying any "flag, banner, or 
device"). 
123 Laurence H. Tribe has described these different types of regulations as falling into 
two "tracks." Regulations that primarily target expressive activity follow "track l," and 
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Those that incidentally burden speech follow 
"track 2" and are subject to the more permissive standard established in O'Brien and 
reformulated in Rust. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-2, 
at 791-92 (2d ed. 1988). 
124 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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and non-speech elements are combined. First, the regulation must be 
promulgated pursuant to a legitimate state power; 125 second, the regulation 
must advance an "important or substantial governmental interest"; 126 third, 
that interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; 127 
and fourth, "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms [must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest." 128 If these conditions are met, the Court has held that "when 
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the 
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms." 129 
Thus, Button notwithstanding, the government could assert that the 
LSC restrictions were constitutionally permissible because they serve an 
important, content-neutral governmental interest (in balancing the budget)130 
that Congress may regulate pursuant to its spending power. 131 Although 
the fourth part of the O'Brien test suggests that the restriction must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest, Rust suggests that the standard of 
tailoring is lower where the government funds the speech activity. Nev-
ertheless, a significant lack of fit may imply that the government's real 
interest is not what it represents, 132 but is in fact the direct suppression of 
speech. 
Part LB of this Article suggested that the regulations are not in fact 
aimed primarily at the non-speech aspect of litigation and political activ-
ity. Rather, they purposefully target the expressive content of the pro-
scribed activities. The legislative history of the regulations reveals Con-
gress's unmistakable intent to eradicate the influence of "liberal" lawyers. 
It does not manifest a concern for such ex post rationales as reducing 
frivolous litigation or the wasting of funds. As Representative Burton 
complained during the Congressional debate over LSC funding, 
The LSC is fighting the welfare reform plan in Wisconsin . 
even though this Congress and the President of the United States 




129 Id. at 376. 
130 See infra Part III discussing the government's current defenses of the LSC 
restrictions. 
131 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to provide for the 
general welfare); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to make all laws 
necessary and proper to execute that power). 
132 See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985) (holding that the 
underinclusiveness of the restriction in that case "cast[s] doubt on [the] genuineness" of 
the government's asserted motive). 
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... support it. Why are taxpayers' dollars being used to fight the 
very things we think are important? . . . The right thing to do is 
protect the people of this country and get rid of the Legal 
Services Corporation. 133 
127 
Moreover, the regulations are both grossly underinclusive and over-
inclusive to effectively address any purpose other than the suppression of 
disfavored speech.134 Although, in O'Brien, the Court stated that it would 
not "strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an 
alleged illicit legislative motive,"135 subsequent cases have made it clear 
that the Court has backed off from this approach. 136 Where the govern-
ment's asserted interest is clearly a sham to hide impermissible content 
discrimination or an otherwise illicit motive, the Court will not uphold 
the regulation merely because, in theory, a neutral reason for it could be 
imagined. 137 Because it is impossible to read the legislative history of the 
LSC restrictions without coming to the conclusion that they were enacted 
133 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8179 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Burton). Representative Weldon expressed a similar sentiment that the LSC was engaging 
in unwelcome litigation. While the LSC recipients he had spoken with were doing "some 
good things . .. representing people who are being unfairly evicted from their housing, 
helping out the poor ... ," Representative Weldon reported that he "did get them [the 
LSC lawyers] to acknowledge that there are LSC lawyers ... that engage in what I would 
call public advocacy to basically thwart the will of the people." Id. at 8182 (statement of 
Rep. Weldon). 
134 See infra Part 111.A.3 (providing a more detailed discussion of the lack of tailoring 
of the restrictions and the inferences that may thereby be raised of an intent to discriminate 
based on content and speaker identity). 
135 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
136 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana 
statute requiring public schools to teach "creation science" whenever they taught evolution 
because the requirement served no secular purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S . 38 (1985) 
(invalidating Alabama statute authorizing schools to set aside one minute at the start of 
the school day for "meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) 
(holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Command-
ments on the walls of each public classroom because the requirement served no secular 
purpose). 
137 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[A] legislature [might] enunciate a sham secular [purpose, but] our courts are capable 
of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one."); Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 
U.S. 788, 833-34 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everyone on the Court agrees that the 
exclusion of 'advocacy' groups from the CFC is prohibited by the First Amendment if it 
is motivated by a bias against the views of the excluded groups."); Board of Educ., Island 
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) ("[W]hether 
petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First 
Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions."); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) ("In order for the state ... to 
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."). 
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to cut off disfavored viewpoints, the restrictions fail the O'Brien test, even 
as incorporated into and softened by Rust. 
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
If the regulations at issue in Rust had not permitted the recipients of 
Title X funding to use other sources to fund their participation in the 
excluded activities, the Court might have struck them down. Under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 138 the Court has consistently held 
that the government may not require parties to forego their constitutional 
rights altogether as a condition of receiving state funding or benefits. 
Applying this doctrine, the two courts that have rendered decisions on the 
LSC restrictions held the restrictions dealing with the use of non-federal 
funds unconstitutional. 139 Although the LSC has revised its regulations on 
the use of non-federal funds pursuant to those decisions, the following 
discussion is included to complete the analysis in the event that Congress 
should again attempt to regulate the use of non-federal funds. 
The clearest statements of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in 
the First Amendment context have come through the trilogy of cases, 
Speiser v. Randall, 140 Perry v. Sindermann, 141 and FCC v. League of Women 
Voters. 142 Speiser and Perry involved the explicit denial of a government 
benefit to individuals engaged in unpopular speech, while League of Women 
Voters dealt with the issue as applied to organizational speech. 
In Speiser, California had conditioned eligibility for a property tax 
exemption on avowing that one did not advocate the forcible overthrow 
of the United States. The Court found that the denial of the exemption 
would have the "effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the 
proscribed speech." 143 Because the condition was "frankly aimed at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas," 144 the fact that the exemption could be 
characterized as a privilege or bounty did not justify the restriction on 
speech. 
138 See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413 n. l (1989) (reviewing and critiquing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). For 
recent scholarship on the subject, see Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 
(1995), and Martin H. Redish and Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free 
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996) . 
139 See Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767 /9 l , slip op. at 16--19 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 
1996); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 97-00032, slip op. at 29 (D. 
Hawaii Feb. 14, 1997) ("This smacks of an unconstitutional condition.") (all cases on file 
with author) . 
140 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
141408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
142 468 U.S. 364 (1984) . 
143 357 U.S . at 519. 
144/d. 
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In Perry, the state Board of Regents fired a professor from his non-
tenured academic job because he made unflattering remarks about its 
policies. The Court held in Perry that, even though a person does not have 
a right to valuable government benefits, government entities may not deny 
benefits "on a basis that infringes . . . constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially ... freedom of speech." 145 As in Speiser, the fact that 
the individual had no right to the benefit at issue, and that the government 
was under no obligation to provide it, did not render the First Amendment 
inquiry irrelevant. 
League of Women Voters, in contrast to Speiser and Perry, involved 
the assertion by an organization that it had been subjected to an uncon-
stitutional condition. In League of Women Voters, Congress had prohibited 
any recipient of a grant from the Public Broadcasting Corporation ("PBC") 
from engaging in "editorializing." The prohibition extended not only to 
the use of federal funds, but to all funds raised by the broadcasting 
stations from any source. The Court found that the editorial speech tar-
geted by the rule lay "at the heart of First Amendment protection," 146 and 
that the government's stated purpose of preventing its entanglement with 
propaganda could not sustain the expansive prohibition. While the federal 
government could require that none of its funds be used for editorializing, 
the Court held that a PBC recipient must be free to segregate its funds, 
"to make known its views on matters of public importance through its 
nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without losing federal grants 
for its noneditorializing broadcast activities."147 
The LSC restrictions, as initially enacted, ran afoul of the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine in precisely the same manner as did the FCC 
restrictions in League of Women Voters. The restrictions reached beyond 
the use of federal funds to prevent LSC recipients from using funds 
derived from any source to engage in the prohibited activities. Thus, in 
its zeal to cut off the disfavored First Amendment activities being pursued 
by LSC lawyers, Congress went too far. 
145 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
146 League of Women Voters , 468 U.S. at 381. 
147 Id. at 400. Cf Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 432 U.S. 450 (1983) 
('TWR" ) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 105-110). The decision in TWR 
involved Congress's decision not to grant tax-exempt status to organizations if a substantial 
portion of their activities consisted of lobbying. Since the Court determined that the 
government was under no obligation to fund such activities, it held that there had been no 
imposition of an unconstitutional condition. After TWR and League of Women Voters, 
otherwise tax-exempt organizations have avoided the restriction at issue in TWR by 
creating separate lobbying organizations. 
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3. Public Forum Analysis 
[Vol. 33 
This section argues that the restrictions on LSC run afoul of the First 
Amendment not simply because they discriminate on the basis of the 
content of speech, but because they are inconsistent with the very purpose 
of the LSC program. In short, in contrast to the situation presented in Rust 
v. Sullivan, there is a legitimate and recognized public forum at issue in 
the case of the LSC. 
The Court's view of the Title X program adopted in Rust allowed it 
to conclude that abortion services could reasonably be excluded from the 
program's scope. Since Congress had authorized a limited family planning 
program, it was not obligated to support services beyond the program's 
limits. This narrow construction of the program's scope was critical to the 
Court's analysis. If the scope were more all-encompassing, both doctors 
and patients participating in the program might have had a reasonable 
expectation "of comprehensive medical advice."148 
While this caveat suggests the possibility that clients might be justified 
in their expectation of comprehensive legal advice, 149 the more interesting 
issue for the LSC case is the Court's careful distinction between the 
nature of the Title X program and other institutions traditionally devoted 
to First Amendment activity. If the government subsidy at issue was not 
in the form of direct funding, but rather was "in the form of Government-
148 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
149 The LSC mandate is considerably broader than the Title X charter. Whereas Title 
X was established specifically to address family planning needs (rather than, for example, 
to provide comprehensive medical care to those in need), the LSC program was established 
to provide equal access to the justice system for all Americans. While Congress never 
intended to provide poor people with all the legal resources available to the wealthy, the 
LSC mandate would have to be narrowed to make it consistent with the latest round of 
restrictions, mocking its original purpose. 
By directing funds to independently organized lawyers, the LSC also enmeshes itself 
in the professional norms of lawyers and their Code of Professional Ethics. These ethical 
rules require lawyers to provide the services they deem most appropriate to their clients' 
needs: therefore LSC clients may have a reasonable expectation of comprehensive service, 
unless the LSC restrictions are considered to override the Code. One of the cases 
challenging the restrictions raised this apparent conflict between a lawyer's professional 
obligations and the LSC restrictions, but no court has yet addressed the issue directly. See 
Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996) (avoiding the resolution 
of the alleged conflict because the court found that the LSC restrictions violated the First 
Amendment); see also discussion supra note 25. 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, a full development of the argument that 
the government may not be able to control its funds with exquisite specificity would be 
worth exploring. For an interesting answer to some of these questions, see David Cole, 
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-
Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 743-47 (1992) (arguing that the government 
should be limited in its ability to control speech within traditional fiduciary relationships). 
Part II.B .3 infra discusses the special status of the lawyer-client relationship in our 
tradition and suggests that Congress's authority to attach limitations to funding in this area 
should be highly restricted. 
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owned property," the Court recognized that the subsidy alone would not 
justify "the restriction of speech in areas that 'have been traditionally 
open to the public for expressive activity ' ... or 'have been expressly 
dedicated to speech activity."'150 Because the Title X program could not 
be described as a forum traditionally or expressly dedicated to speech 
activity, the Court concluded that the restrictions on speech affected by 
the regulations were permissible. 
The Court thus briefly invoked the "public forum" concept and found 
that it did not apply. Although the Court's public forum jurisprudence is 
notoriously confused, 151 at its core it is concerned with the relative im-
portance of a particular space or institution to expressive activity. The 
finding of a public forum can either raise or lower the level of scrutiny 
applied to a restriction. 152 But once the Court has begun to analyze a 
restriction in terms of its relationship to a public forum, it has already 
taken a significant analytical step towards accepting that those seeking 
access to the forum are engaged primarily in First Amendment activity 
rather than non-expressive conduct. 153 
In Rust, as discussed above, the Court did not engage in this analysis 
because it did not consider the underlying activity to be sufficiently 
"expressive" to meet the threshold question asked in its public forum 
cases. 154 Since the Court characterized abortion counseling as speech inci-
dental to the provision of family planning services, it was willing to 
compromise abortion counseling in the name of the government's author-
ity to determine which services to provide. In the case of the LSC restric-
tions, however, which are more easily characterized as targeting speech, 
the Rust Court's method of analysis may be inappropriate. 
150 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S . 720, 726 
(1990)). 
151 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 149, 718-19 (1992) (stating that the Court's public 
forum cases have "generated one of the most confused and widely-criticized doctrines of 
[F]irst [A]mendment law"). See also C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public 
Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986) 
(criticizing the Court's public forum jurisprudence); Geoffrey Stone, Fora Americana: 
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233 (same). 
152 See Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 91 (1987) 
("[A]lthough it is clear that the Court applies different standards of review for public 
forums and nonpublic forums, it is less clear precisely what standard it applies."). 
153 See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (holding that the threshold 
issue that must be decided in applying a public forum analysis is whether the activity 
allegedly excluded qualifies as "speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, 
we need go no further"). 
154 Christina Wells has noted that the Court's "treatment of abortion counseling [in 
Rust] as a form of activity rather than a form of speech" has much to do with its "emerging 
view that abortion is no longer a fundamental right." Since the status of the activity 
associated with the speech has gone down in the Court 's conception of fundamental rights, 
the speech has been afforded less protection. See Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling 
as Vice Activity: the Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1725-26 (1995). 
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Public forum analysis may ultimately contribute little to the outcome 
of the LSC case. 155 Nevertheless, it is another prism through which to 
view the restrictions, which takes seriously the First Amendment nature 
of the prohibited activities while balancing them against the government's 
interest in using its property-here, its money-in the manner it sees fit. 156 
a. Establishing the Forum 
The Court generally has recognized two types of public forums: 
traditional public forums, such as streets and sidewalks, 157 and designated 
public forums, such as school auditoriums, which the state has set aside 
for expressive activity. 158 While restrictions on traditional public forums 
are subject to strict scrutiny, 159 restrictions on the use of designated public 
155 As Justice Kennedy noted in his separate opinion in Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2413 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), whether the Court finds a public 
forum does not change the fact that "strict scrutiny is the baseline rule for reviewing any 
content-based discrimination against speech. The purpose of forum analysis is to determine 
whether, because of the property or medium where speech takes place, there should be 
any dispensation from this rule."). 
156 Forum analysis also takes into account the distinction that the Court has occasion-
ally invoked between the government's speech and private speech funded by the govern-
ment. In a nonpublic forum, the government controls the content of speech because the 
property has been dedicated to the government's purposes. In a public forum, however, 
private speakers are free to express their own views, even though they enjoy a government 
subsidy in the form of the forum. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995). The Court stated: 
Id. 
[W]e have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not 
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its 
own message .... [W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote 
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes .. . . It does not 
follow, however ... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the Uni-
versity [or in this case, the government] does not itself speak or subsidize 
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers. 
157 See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding that 
"streets and parks .. . [have] ... time out of mind ... been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions"). 
158 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(defining designated public fora as "public property which the State has opened for use 
by the public as a place for expressive activity."). See also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985) ("In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by 
government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at 
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain 
subjects."). 
159 See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45 ("In ... quintessential public forums, the 
government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a 
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."). 
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forums are subject to less searching review, unless the state has designated 
an "unlimited" public forum. Restrictions on the use of limited designated 
public forums are permissible so long as they are consistent with the 
stated purposes of the forum and are viewpoint neutral. 160 Access to 
nonpublic forums, such as government property that has not been designated 
for expressive activity, may be denied by the government at its discretion, 
so long as distinctions are not made on the basis of viewpoint. 161 In recent 
years, the Court has recognized that even non-tangible property, such as 
a pool of funding, may be considered a "metaphysical forum" and therefore 
is subject to the restrictions associated with that status. 162 
Traditional public forums are relatively easily identified. 163 To deter-
mine whether the state has created a designated public forum, however, 
the Supreme Court held that it will look at the intent of the state actor 
creating the forum, and at the nature of the forum itself. In Cornelius v. 
NAACP, the Court stated, "[ w ]e will not find that a public forum has been 
created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent . . . nor will we 
infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the 
160 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once it has opened a limited forum ... the 
State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech 
where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."') 
(internal citations omitted). 
161 The Court in Perry Educ. Ass 'n stated: 
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions 
in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions 
may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the 
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended 
purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is 
whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue 
serves. 
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49. 
162 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 ("The SAF [Student Activities Fund] is a forum 
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are 
applicable."). The Rosenberger rationale has been picked up in at least three lower court 
decisions since it was handed down, two involving public funding rather than physical 
spaces. For example, in Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th 
Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit applied Rosenberger to invalidate a city's policy prohibiting 
sectarian instruction and religious worship in city-owned senior centers, holding that the 
policy constituted impermissible viewpoint rather than content-based discrimination within 
a designated public forum. In Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 
1548 (M.D. Ala. 1996), the Alabama district court similarly invalidated a statute prohib-
iting any college or university from spending public funds on or allowing the use of 
facilities by any organization promoting homosexual lifestyles. In Finley v. National 
Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit applied 
Rosenberger in the context of funding for the arts, holding that discrimination based on 
viewpoint was impermissible because of the vital role that the arts, like universities, play 
in our democracy. 
163 These are the places that have "time out of mind" been dedicated to speech activity. 
See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
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nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity." 164 In Cor-
nelius, the Court examined the government's policy and practice in cre-
ating the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), and determined that there 
had been no intent to create a public forum for solicitation. Rather, 
ironically, the Court found that the CFC had been created to "minimize 
the disruption to the workplace that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc 
solicitation activities by lessening the amount of expressive activity oc-
curring on federal property." 165 Since there had been no intent to create a 
public forum, the Court would not infer the creation of one. 166 
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion, 167 the Court similarly refused to find the creation of a public forum 
in a school district mail system. "If by policy or by practice the Perry 
School District ha[d] opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the 
general public,' ' 168 then, in the Court's view, there might have been a 
plausible argument that a public forum had been created. Because the 
school had only selectively allowed outside groups access to the mail 
system, however, no public forum had been established, and no particular 
organization could claim a right of access to a system that had been 
lawfully dedicated to "facilitate internal communication of school-related 
matters to the teachers." 169 
In Perry, the Court specifically declined to find the creation of a 
limited public forum. Recognizing the possibility that such a forum could 
exist, the Court in dictum suggested that if a limited forum were to have 
been created, an organization's right to access the forum would turn on 
whether it was the type of organization for which the forum had been 
created. "[E]ven if we assume that by granting access to the Cub Scouts, 
YMCA's, [sic] and parochial schools, the School District ha[d] created a 
'limited' public forum, the constitutional right of access would in any 
event extend only to other entities of similar character."170 Although other 
"organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational rele-
vance to students"171 might then have a right of access, the plaintiffs in 
Perry, who were "concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher 
employment"172 would not. 
164473 U.S. 788, 803. 
165 Id. at 805. 
166 See id. ("That [First Amendment] activity occurs in the context of the forum created 
does not imply that the forum thereby becomes a public forum for First Amendment 
purposes."). 
161 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
168 Id. at 47 . 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 48. 
111Id. 
172 Id. 
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Considered together, Perry and Cornelius instruct that the Court will 
not find the creation of even a limited forum unless the government has 
created one by explicit statement, practice, or policy. Moreover, the right 
of access to a limited forum depends on its designated purpose. An 
individual asserting a right of access to a forum therefore first must point 
to evidence of the creation of a public forum. Second, if the forum is of 
limited character, the individual must demonstrate either that he or she is 
"like" those who have been granted access or that, to the extent that he 
or she is unlike those granted access, the distinction is an impermissible 
basis for exclusion. 
The Court has taken up these themes in its subsequent cases discuss-
ing the creation of a limited public forum. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free School District, 173 Widmar v. Vincent, 174 and Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 175 the Court 
addressed the creation of a limited public forum in, respectively, a school 
district's program making school facilities available to community organi-
zations, a university's program making empty classrooms available to 
student groups, and a university's student activities fund. In these cases, 
relevant factors for the Court's determination of whether a public forum 
had been created included the schools' written policies and their ongoing 
practices. In each case, the Court found that there had been an impermis-
sible exclusion from the forum. 
In Rosenberger, the Court analyzed the University of Virginia's pro-
hibition on the distribution of funds to religious organizations in terms of 
the general purposes of the student activities fund ("SAF") established by 
the University Guidelines, which contained the prohibition. The fact that 
the prohibition may have been in place since the inception of the program 
did not bar the Court's conclusion that the prohibition was inconsistent 
with the program's overall purpose of "support[ing] a broad range of 
extracurricular student activities that are 'related to the educational pur-
pose of the University."' 176 Since the Court believed that the prohibition 
singled out a particular viewpoint for discrimination, it was inconsistent 
with the historical commitment of a university as an institution dedicated 
to the free exchange of ideas, and the University of Virginia's specific 
commitment in creating the SAF to fund all student organizations con-
tributing to that exchange. 177 
173 508 U.S . 384 (1993). 
174 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
11s515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
176 /d. at 824 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Cert. at 61a). 
177 See id. at 835 (noting that viewpoint discrimination is especially dangerous in the 
context of a public university, "where the State acts against a background and tradition of 
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition"). 
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In Widmar v. Vincent, 178 which preceded Rosenberger by fourteen 
years, the Court similarly held that a university could not prohibit relig-
ious groups from using its facilities once it had "created a forum generally 
open for use by student groups." 179 Even if the university was not required 
to create the forum in the first place, once it adopted a policy making 
classrooms "generally open to the public," the university "assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms." 180 The Court concluded that the university's regu-
lations did not withstand strict scrutiny because the regulations discrimi-
nated against "forms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment"181 on the basis of the religious content of that speech. To 
save its content-based exclusion, the university would have to show that 
the exclusion "serve[d] a compelling state interest and that it [was] nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end." 182 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mo riches Union Free School District, 183 
decided after Widmar and before Rosenberger, stands for the same prin-
ciple, although the Court in Lamb's Chapel never reached the question of 
whether the school district had established a public forum. In Lamb's 
Chapel, a school district had denied a church access to school premises 
to show a religious film, although the district generally allowed the use 
of its facilities for civic, recreational, and social purposes. The Court held 
that the exclusion of religious groups constituted impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination regardless of the status of the forum created or the school 
district's intent. Although the district undeniably had the right to "pre-
serve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated" 184 
and was under no obligation to "permit[] after-hours use of its property 
for any . . . uses," 185 the Court held that it could not single out religious 
viewpoints for exclusion. Citing its other nonpublic forum cases, the 
Court stated, "control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on 
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are 
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint 
neutral." 186 The distinction made by the school district was not viewpoint 
neutral and thus was impermissible. 
Although it did not treat them separately in its opinions, the Court's 
determination in each case seemed to rest on two related concerns. First, 
178 454 U.S . 263 (1981) . 
179 Id. at 267. 
180 Id. at 267-68. 
181 Id. at 269 . 
. 
182 Id. at 270. 
183 508 U.S . 384 (1993). 
184 Id. at 390. 
185 Id. at 39 l. 
186 1d. at 392-93, (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S . 788, 806 (1985) and Perry 
Educ. Ass ' n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass ' n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)). 
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the Court determined whether the excluded organizations were "like" 
those granted access. Second, the Court assessed the programs in light of 
the important role institutions of public education have traditionally played 
in American democracy. 187 Since, as the Court recognized in Rust v. Sullivan, 
universities represent "a traditional sphere of free expression so funda-
mental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to 
control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the 
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the ... First Amend-
ment," 188 the universities' exclusions were subject to heightened scrutiny. 
Unlike the Combined Federal Campaign in Cornelius, or the school 
mail system in Perry, or even the family planning clinics in Rust, institu-
tions of public education are, in the Court's view, fundamental to the 
well-being of our society. Whereas restrictions on speech within the confines 
of more limited forums do not greatly threaten societal-wide harms, re-
strictions on speech within spheres expressly dedicated to First Amend-
ment activity, such as the university, have the potential to undermine the 
basic structure of our society. Connecting the two concerns described 
above, the Court's limited public forum cases suggest that where the 
institution seeking to impose a restriction is one that is inherently devoted 
to First Amendment activity, the Court will assume that the institution's 
ability to restrict or redefine189 the forum is highly circumscribed. For 
those few institutions that may be considered fundamental to the func-
187 Cf Board of Educ., Island Trees Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) 
(acknowledging that "public schools are vitally important in the preparation of individuals 
for participation as citizens, and as vehicles for inculcating fundamental values necessary 
to the maintenance of a democratic political system ... ") (internal citations omitted). 
188 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
189 If the government may continually redefine the scope of the program to exclude 
restricted activities, then there will never be any basis for the argument that a given 
restriction is inconsistent with the scope of the program. As scholars have noted in the 
area of unconstitutional conditions, "[t]o decide whether a condition on funding makes a 
recipient worse off, one must adopt some baseline from which to measure." Cole, supra 
note 149, at 696 n.82 (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Fore-
word: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 13 (1988) and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative 
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352-59 (1984)). 
The problem with the Court's current approach to funding cases is that it "generally 
articulates no independent baseline, and simply accepts the government's definition of the 
benefit program as the baseline .. . . However, taken to extremes this approach would 
allow government to avoid any unconstitutional condition by simply redefining its pro-
gram." Cole, supra note 149 at 696 n.82. As in the unconstitutional conditions area, 
restrictions attached to direct funding may never be deemed impermissible if there is no 
limit to the government's ability to redefine the scope of a program each time it imposes 
a new restriction. Some independent baseline must exist by which restrictions may be 
evaluated. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 
2413-14 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If Government 
has a freer hand to draw content-based distinctions in limiting a forum than in excluding 
someone from it, the First Amendment would be a dead letter in designated public forums; 
every exclusion could be recast as a limitation."). 
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tioning of our society, even content-based exclusions such as those that 
were upheld in Perry may be impermissible. 
Where a government program supports expressive activity, even within 
the confines of an institution not fundamental to the functioning of our 
society, 190 the Court's public forum cases suggest that the relevant baseline 
is not simply the initial charter of a program. Rather, the relevant provi-
sions of a charter are those that define the scope and purpose of the 
program in broad, constitutionally-permissible strokes. For example, al-
lowing the facilities of a senior citizens center-an institution arguably 
not fundamental to the functioning of our society-to be used by com-
munity groups only during specified hours should be viewed as a permis-
sible restriction aimed at preserving the center's buildings and resources. 
A declaration that all groups except those espousing a religious viewpoint 
may use the facilities should be viewed as impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination, even if the exclusion were written into the initial rules author-
izing the program. Although the center could claim that the purpose of 
the program was to support non-religious activities during the specified 
hours, the Court undeniably would find this purpose impermissible. 
Where the institution supporting the expressive activity is itself fun-
damental to the functioning of our society, however, the government's 
ability to limit access is properly viewed as even more restricted. The 
Court in Rust acknowledged this principle when it distinguished family 
planning clinics from public forums and universities. 191 Public forums and 
universities have in common the near identity of their purposes with First 
Amendment activity and the important role that each has played histori-
cally in the development of thought in our society. The presence of 
government funding in these areas, while it is to be applauded to the 
extent that it supports their traditional functions, becomes suspect when 
it represents an attempt to displace traditional norms with a state-spon-
sored agenda. 192 
190 The Court has yet to address the exact issue of what level of restrictions would be 
permissible in a limited public forum operating within an institution not fundamental to 
society. Each of the cases where the Court found the existence of a limited public forum 
arose in the context of a school or university, which the Court clearly considers funda-
mental. Conversely, the Court held that there was no forum in each case suggesting the 
presence of a limited public forum within a lesser institution. See, e.g., International Soc'y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S . 672 (1992) (holding that an airport 
terminal was not a public forum, even though First Amendment activity occurred therein, 
because airports were neither historically nor expressly dedicated to First Amendment 
activity). The logic of the Court's decisions in this area, however, suggests that if a forum 
for expressive activity were recognized within an institution of lesser importance, such as 
a senior citizens center, the standard of review should be higher than if there were no 
forum, as in Rust, but less than where the institution is fundamental, as in Rosenberger. 
19 1 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S . 173, 200 (1991). 
192 As David Cole has argued, the "government cannot avoid [F]irst [A]mendment 
scrutiny [in these areas] by arguing that it has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of 
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The Court has never announced an exhaustive list of areas or institutions 
deemed fundamental to the functioning of our society; rather, the Court 
has chosen to identify such areas and institutions slowly over time. 193 The 
following section argues for the inclusion of legal services in this emerg-
ing list. Because legal representation, by tradition and by ongoing prac-
tice, constitutes core First Amendment activity that is critical to the func-
tioning of our society, the government's ability to impose its norms in this 
area, even as a condition of funding, should be highly restricted. 
b. Application to the LSC Case 
The LSC program should be viewed as a limited public forum because 
it has been dedicated since its inception to core First Amendment activity, 
namely the provision of legal advice and services. Congress created the 
LSC a decade after the Supreme Court held in United States v. Button 
that efforts to secure and act upon legal advice fall within constitution-
ally-protected freedoms. 194 The LSC represents an attempt to make those 
freedoms meaningfully available to those who would otherwise be "unable 
to afford adequate legal counsel," or to seek "redress of grievances." 195 
Recognizing that "for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services 
has reaffirmed faith in our government of laws,"196 Congress established 
the LSC with a broad mandate to serve "the ends of justice."197 
constitutional rights." Cole, supra note 149, at 681. Even though the government funds 
these areas by its own choice, First Amendment scrutiny applies because "each of these 
institutions plays a central role in shaping and contributing to public debate, and because 
the internal functioning of each institution demands insulation from government content 
control." Cole, supra note 149, at 682. Cole suggests that these critical institutions should 
be considered "spheres of neutrality," or exceptions to the government's general authority 
to control the use of its funds with specificity, on account of "the role of [these] particular 
institutions in maintaining a rigorous and diverse public dialogue, and a free citizenry." 
Cole, supra note 149, at 682. 
193 David Cole has suggested that public forums, public universities, and the press are 
most easily recognized as "spheres of neutrality" in light of the Court's decisions. Cole 
has also applied his analysis to government funding for the arts and government-funded 
counseling programs, arguing that these areas should similarly be deemed neutral. See 
Cole, supra note 149, at 717-47. 
194 The House Report accompanying the Legal Service Corporation Act of 1974 
explicitly invoked Button to explain that the restrictions contained within the bill should 
be read so as to be consistent with the First Amendment and lawyers' professional 
responsibilities to their clients. See H.R. REP. No. 93-247(1974), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3881 ("Pursuant to Supreme Court decisions (such as NMCP v. 
Button) and in accordance with the general responsibilities of attorneys to their clients ... 
the bill does not seek to prevent recipients and their employees from fully apprising the 
client community of its legal rights and properly informing poor people about the merits 
of prospective litigation."). 
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The legislative history of the LSC provides ample evidence to meet the 
standards announced in Cornelius for the creation of a designated public 
forum. 198 The statute creating the program evidences an intent to dedicate 
funds to what had already been declared by the Supreme Court to constitute 
First Amendment activity. The nature of the property at issue-the funds 
dedicated to legal services-is by definition consistent with expressive 
activity, much as the student activities fund in Rosenberger was inherently 
consistent with expressive activity on the university campus. The LSC 
funds are unlike the school mail system in Perry that was created for one 
purpose and then allegedly diverted toward expression. Rather, the LSC 
funds were dedicated from the beginning to "encourag[ing] and pro-
mot[ing] the use of our institutions for the orderly redress of grievances 
and as a means of securing worthwhile reform," 199 in recognition of the 
fact that "justice is served far better and differences are settled more 
rationally within the system than on the streets."200 Viewed in this light, the 
LSC was thus conceived as a way to move poor people's grievances from 
the streets, a public forum from time immemorial, to the courts. 
Since its inception, the primary criterion for eligibility for LSC as-
sistance has been income. 201 Individual LSC grantees have been free to 
determine their own financial eligibility requirements within the limits of 
the LSC Act and federal regulations.202 Although no individual in poverty 
has a right to LSC assistance,203 the forum created in the LSC fund has 
been in principle open to all who are "alike" in that they are poor and in 
need of legal representation. Like the student organizations in Rosenber-
ger who had no right to the University of Virginia's Student Activities 
Fund simply on account of being a student organization, individuals have 
no right to LSC assistance simply by virtue of being poor. Nevertheless, 
much like the student organizations in Rosenberger, individuals seeking 
the assistance of LSC grantees have the right not to be excluded on an 
impermissible basis, such as viewpoint. As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Rosenberger, "[t]he government cannot justify viewpoint discrimina-
tion among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."204 If there 
198 See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802--03 (1985) (holding that a public forum 
can be created only "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse 
... [on a property the nature of which is] consistent with expressive activity"). 
199 H.R. REP. No. 93-247(1974), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3881. 
200 Id. 
201 See id. (stating that "[c]lients' eligibility for legal assistance will essentially be 
determined by their impoverished circumstances"). 
202 see LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5. 
203 See Howard Gault Co. v. Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 916, 936 
(N.D.Tex. 1985), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 848 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 
1988) (holding that the LSC Act "does not create in an indigent any right to legal services 
which is enforceable under Section 1983"). 
204 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995). 
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are not sufficient funds to distribute among eligible recipients, "it [is] 
incumbent on the state . . . to ration or allocate the scarce resources 
[according to] some acceptable neutral principle."205 
The LSC statute has contained since its inception, however, exclu-
sions that violate the principle for which Rosenberger has come to stand. 
In an effort to maintain the strength of the LSC, Congress declared that 
"the legal services program must be kept free from the influence of or use 
by it of political pressures."206 To effectuate the latter part of that concern, 
Congress prohibited LSC grantees from participating in cases involving 
desegregation, abortion, and military desertion. It also limited the ability 
of LSC grantees to participate in class actions and lobbying activities.207 
But the fact that such restrictions were a part of the original LSC statute, 
and in turn have been supplemented several times, is not proof of their 
validity. As in Rosenberger, the general purposes of the LSC program may 
require the invalidation of exclusions that indicate that the government 
has misunderstood its responsibilities208 or its limitations. Where a pro-
gram has been expressly dedicated to First Amendment activity, and has 
thereby been designated a public forum, any exclusions must be objec-
tively "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,"209 not 
simply necessary or desirable in the eyes of its creators. 
In the case of the LSC, the public forum has been dedicated to those 
First Amendment activities, recognized in Button, that are associated with 
the provision of legal services. Restrictions placed on the LSC must 
therefore be reasonable in light of the guiding purpose of the program. 
To be sustainable under Rosenberger, content-based restrictions on LSC 
grantees must be consistent with the general purpose of the program and 
not represent hidden viewpoint discrimination.210 Restrictions on LSC 
grantees must therefore be analogous to limitations on a public univer-
sity's funding for student organizations that state that no student peri-
odicals whatsoever are eligible for funding. Some of the LSC restrictions 
arguably fall into this latter category of regulation. However, the restric-
tions on class actions by LSC grantees and all political reform efforts 
clearly do not. Viewed in light of their legislative history, these restric-
tions do not represent an attempt to allocate scarce funding according to 
a neutral principle, but rather mark an effort to silence liberal viewpoints. 
20s Id. 
20642 u.s.c. § 2996(5) (1994). 
207 See note 15, supra, describing the history of such restrictions. 
208 In Rosenberger, for example, the University of Virginia defended its exclusion of 
religious groups from the SAF on the grounds that it thought it was obligated to do so by 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-40. 
209 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 
( 1985)). 
210 See id. (noting "viewpoint discrimination is presumed impermissible when directed 
against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations"). 
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As in Rosenberger, the fact that the LSC restrictions have been incorpo-
rated into the charter of the LSC program does not bootstrap them into 
legitimacy. 
The Court's viewpoint-discrimination jurisprudence thus would seem 
to provide an adequate basis for invalidating the political LSC restrictions. 
However, the second strain of the Court's school cases, which were dis-
cussed previously, suggests that restrictions on speech within fundamental 
institutions such as universities are particularly dangerous. This reasoning 
may provide additional support for the argument that even the "viewpoint-
neutral" content restrictions attached to the LSC are constitutionally sus-
pect. Just as the state, in creating a public university "acts against a 
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center 
of our intellectual and philosophic tradition,"211 so too does Congress, in 
creating and funding the LSC, act against the backdrop of legal repre-
sentation in the Anglo-American tradition. The lawyer-client relationship 
and the work product of the attorney212 have long enjoyed a unique level 
of protection in our system of justice.213 Lawyers are subject to a Code 
of Professional Responsibility, which requires them to exercise independent 
judgment on behalf of their clients, regardless of who pays their legal 
fees. 214 These traditions and professional responsibilities suggest that the 
lawyer enjoys a special status in our system that should not be lightly 
disregarded even as Congress asserts its right to control the programs it 
funds. 
When it created the LSC in 197 4, Congress contemplated that the 
Corporation would provide legal services for indigent clients consistent 
with these traditions. The legislative record is replete with references to 
the lawyers' Canon of Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility, as 
guideposts for LSC lawyers.215 For example, the House Report accompa-
211 Id. at 835. 
212 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947) ("[T]he general policy 
against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized 
and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests 
on the one who would invade that privacy ... . ") . 
Id. 
213 See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The Court stated: 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications known to the common law. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege 
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends .... 
214 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.8(f) (August 1983, as 
Amended to February 1997); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR-5-
107(A), (B), EC 5-21, EC 5-22 (1983). 
215 See H.R. REP. No. 93-247, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3880 ("[I]t is 
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nying the 1974 Act explained that even the initial restrictions on political 
reform efforts did not preclude lawyers from participating in such matters 
in a representational capacity, where they felt that such efforts were 
consistent with their ethical and professional obligations.216 In short, Con-
gress intended to create a program to provide poor people with lawyers 
possessed of independent and professional judgment. As the House Report 
stated, a choice of "how best to proceed in particular cases is always best 
left to the attorney and client, and the Corporation should not seek to 
substitute its judgment for that of the attorney in determining how best 
to serve the interests of particular clients."217 
If Congress, in one legislative act, created a program to fund lawyers, 
yet simultaneously limited their professional capabilities by barring cer-
tain subjects and legal activities, one wonders which half of the act 
Congress intended to take precedence. If Congress was truly committed 
to providing lawyers to poor people, then the restrictions on subject 
matter seem inconsistent with this purpose. Introducing restrictions on the 
lawyer's representational capacities, based solely on the source of the 
funding, is inconsistent with every tradition and professional ethic dictat-
ing undivided loyalty to the client.218 If the restrictions are of utmost 
importance to Congress, then it would appear that Congress was not really 
serious about providing lawyers to the LSC's intended beneficiaries. Rather, 
the LSC program would become merely a paralegal or legal referral 
service for poor people. Congress, however, is limited in its ability to 
redefine a traditional profession by choosing to fund only certain aspects 
of it.219 Restrictions that are inconsistent with lawyers' traditional respon-
sibilities should cede to the larger purpose of the program since it appears 
expected that information about clients will be obtained solely through a simple form and 
that eligibility will be determined in a manner that produces utmost trust and confidence 
between attorney and client."). 
216 See id. (analyzing the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 6d(4)). 
217 /d. (analyzing the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 7(7)). 
218 In the criminal defense context, the Court has noted that a lawyer paid by the 
government to represent indigent clients "retains all of the essential attributes of a private 
attorney, including, most importantly, his 'professional independence,' which the State is 
constitutionally obliged to respect." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Distinguishing 
the legal profession from the medical profession, for example, the Court noted that "[i]n 
contrast to the public defender, [the doctor's] professional and ethical obligation to make 
independent medical judgments did not set him in conflict with the State . .. . " Id. at 51; 
cf Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S . 312, 318-19 (1981) (explaining the role of a public 
defender). Although criminal defense is different from civil representation, Dodson and 
West stand for the principle that a lawyer's professional responsibilities are fundamentally 
different from those of members of the other professions, and may inherently require 
opposing the state's interests. 
219 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (raising but not resolving the 
question that it "could be argued . . . that traditional relationships such as that between 
doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government 
regulation, even when subsidized by the Government"). 
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from the legislative record that Congress believed it was creating a pro-
gram to provide lawyers to poor people. 
More important than any overriding congressional purpose is the fact 
that the limitations undermine the integrity of an institution that is fun-
damental to the functioning of our society. Like the public university, the 
untrammeled lawyer-client relationship is critical to the health of our legal 
system and our political democracy. Button highlighted the important First 
Amendment content of the lawyer-client relationship; this relationship, 
however, enjoyed protection long before Button because of the "broad[] 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."220 
To the extent that the government becomes involved in regulating the 
types of cases lawyers may assist their clients with, or which procedural 
devices they may employ, the relationship between lawyer and client 
becomes tainted by government influence. 
Although the concrete harm in each individual case where a client is 
referred to a non-LSC legal organization for assistance may be difficult 
to identify, the cumulative effect of allowing the government to effectively 
redefine the lawyer-client relationship suggests a problem of societal pro-
portion. In the LSC context, as in the public university setting, the gov-
ernment may choose not to fund "fundamental" institutions. But once it 
does, it should not meddle with the institution's internal workings. Certain 
spheres are simply too important to allow the government to "buy up" in 
exchange for the control that generally comes with ownership. In the case 
of the LSC restrictions, a unique bundle of individual rights and societal 
interests are threatened. These include the First Amendment rights of the 
LSC lawyers and their clients, and the societal interest in preserving the 
integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. 
III. The LSC Restrictions Violate the Equal Protection Component of 
the Due Process Clause 
The LSC restrictions also raise a number of concerns under the equal 
protection component of the Constitution. The speech suppressed by the 
restrictions is undeniably connected to a disfavored group in our society-
the poor. The restrictions reflect a desire on the part of Congress not only 
to not hear from the poor and their advocates, but also to keep them out 
of court. The restrictions reflect a bias on the part of Congress against the 
poor and they impinge on the fundamental right of access to the courts. 
This section will analyze the LSC restrictions in light of the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause, as an alternative basis on 
which the restrictions may be deemed unconstitutional. 
220 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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A. The LSC Restrictions Represent Invidious Bias 
Under traditional equal protection analysis, only those regulations 
that single out a group of people based on race, religion, national origin, 
or gender are subject to heightened scrutiny.221 Those that single out the 
poor as a group for disparate treatment are subject to mere rational basis 
review,222 such that the government must demonstrate only "that the stat-
ute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."223 Particularly in 
matters of social and economic regulation, the Court will generally grant 
legislatures "wide latitude" to exercise their judgment, presuming that 
"even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
processes."224 
1. The Poor 
Although rational basis review is highly deferential, it is not entirely 
without bite. In several important cases affecting the poor, the Court 
found that the state failed to carry the admittedly light burden imposed 
by rational basis review. In the context of criminal law, for example, the 
Court has struck down statutes effectively imposing differential prison 
sentences based on wealth225 or differential liability for the expenses of 
providing counsel. 226 The Court also has required states to provide trial 
221 Legislative classifications based on race, religion, or national origin are subject to 
the highest level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, because "these factors are so seldom relevant 
to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considera-
tions are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened 
class are not as worthy or deserving as others." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) (examining 
classifications based on race); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (analyzing 
classifications based on religion); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) 
(discussing national origin). Legislative classifications based on gender are subject to an 
intermediate level of scrutiny, in recognition ·of the fact that gender "generally provides 
no sensible ground for differential treatment." Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. See, 
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275-76 (1996) (applying intermediate 
review standard to strike down the Virginia Military Institute's policy of excluding 
women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (announcing intermediate review standard). 
222 See, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (applying 
low level standard of review to school financing scheme that discriminated against the 
poor); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (applying rational basis review to 
state's summary eviction procedures); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) 
(applying rational basis review to state's imposition of an upper limit on its cash assistance 
to families). 
223 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. 
224 /d. 
225 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242-45 (1970) (striking down state statute 
allowing for imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum period where the imprisoned 
individual was unable to pay an assessed fine or court costs). 
226 See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972) (striking down a statute 
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transcripts for indigent defendants appealing their criminal convictions227 
and counsel in a first appeal of right. 228 
While the restrictions at issue in these cases generally implicated the 
fundamental liberty interests of the poor and were therefore subject to 
even more searching review under the Equal Protection Clause, 229 the 
wealth-based distinctions also were analyzed in terms of rational basis 
review. In James v. Strange, for example, where the regulation at issue 
did not impair the liberty interests of indigent defendants, but rather 
subjected them to heightened liability for the cost of counsel, the Court 
found that the classification employed was irrational. Recognizing that 
"state recoupment statutes may betoken legitimate state interests,"230 the 
Court nevertheless found that those interests could not justify the distinc-
tion made between "indigent criminal defendants" and "other classes of 
debtors." 231 Because the state's recoupment statute put the indigent defen-
dant uniquely at risk of losing "the means needed to keep himself and his 
family afloat,"232 the Court held that it "embodie[d] elements of punitive-
ness and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal 
treatment under the law."233 
2. Other Non-Suspect Classes 
The Court has also applied rational basis review to strike down 
classifications in other contexts where the poor were not affected. As in 
Strange, the Court has suspected in these cases the presence of punitive-
ness and discrimination that violate the spirit of equal protection. In 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,234 City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center,235 and, most recently, Romer v. Evans,236 the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional legislative enactments that could not 
be explained in terms of anything other than invidious bias.237 Because 
imposing liability on indigent defendants for expenditures made by the state in the 
provision of counsel). 
221 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
228 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963). 
229 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
230 Strange, 407 U.S. at 141. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 136. 
233 Id. at 142. 
234 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
235 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
236116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) . 
237 Cass Sunstein has described these cases as the "Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy," 
wherein the Court "ruled off-limits a constitutionally unacceptable 'animus' not involving 
federalism or discrimination on the basis of race or sex." Cass Sunstein, Foreword: 
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1996). 
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such bias could not be considered a legitimate governmental purpose, the 
Court has held that the enactments failed under rational basis review. 
In Moreno, the Court considered a subsection of the Food Stamp Act 
that excluded from participation "any household containing an individual 
who is unrelated to any other member of the household."238 Searching for 
a legitimate state purpose to sustain the exclusion, the Court found evi-
dence in the legislative history only for the contention that the exclusion 
was "intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from 
participating in the food stamp program."239 
The Court rejected the government's assertion that the exclusion 
served the additional purpose of minimizing fraud in the administration 
of the food stamp program. It noted that the Act elsewhere contained 
specific provisions addressing fraud, and found that the denial of food to 
households containing unrelated individuals represented an irrationally 
overbroad response to the problem posed by these particular households, 
and an underinclusive response to fraud generally. Concluding that there 
was no plausible justification for the exclusion, the Court struck it down. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, announced a principle that would 
be applied in later cases finding invidious bias: "if the constitutional 
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."240 
In Cleburne Living Center, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a city's requirement that operators of a group home for the mentally 
retarded obtain a special use permit. Finding that the requirement had 
been imposed solely out of fear of the mentally retarded, the Court held 
that the requirement could not survive rational basis review. As in Moreno, 
the Court searched the record for some "rational basis for believing that 
the [group] home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate 
interests." 241 The Court considered the city's various arguments regarding 
"fire hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance of 
danger to other residents,"242 but found that such concerns could not 
justify the singling out of this particular home. While the city's expressed 
concerns may have been legitimate, its imposition of the special permit 
requirement on the group home for the retarded, without imposing a 
similar requirement on other structures and dwellings threatening similar 
harms, was irrational. As the Court concluded, "[t]he short of it is that 
238 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. 
239 /d. at 534. 
240 Id. 
241 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
242 Id. at 450. 
148 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 33 
requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded .... "243 
Romer applied this intuition to the highly unusual case of a state 
referendum, Colorado's Amendment 2, prohibiting all legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimina-
tion. Although homosexuals, like the poor and the mentally retarded, are 
not a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection analysis, the Court 
nevertheless found the referendum unconstitutional. Applying rational ba-
sis review, the Court again found that the action was motivated by invidi-
ous bias against an unpopular group. 
Analyzing the referendum against the backdrop of the state's asserted 
objectives of respecting "other citizens' freedom of association-in par-
ticular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or relig-
ious objections to homosexuality,''244 as well as the state's interest "in 
conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups"245-the 
Court found a fatal disconnect. The referendum was "at once too narrow 
and too broad"246 to have been genuinely conceived as an effort to further 
these interests, since "[i]t identifies persons by a single trait and then 
denies them protection across the board."247 The discontinuity of the 
referendum with the state's asserted interests raised the inference that it 
was "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects,"248 
and that the measure therefore lacked "a rational relationship to legitimate 
state interests."249 
The rational basis standard that emerges from Moreno, Cleburne 
Living Center, and Romer is thus one that has considerably more bite than 
the standard applied in "the ordinary case, [where] a law will be sustained 
if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the 
law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or 
if the rationale for it seems tenuous."250 Where the Court suspects that the 
classification is "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law,"251 it will not be sustained. Moreno thus established and 
Romer confirmed that sheer dislike for an unpopular group is not a legitimate 
basis for discriminatory state action. 
243 Id. 
244 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996). 
mid. 
246 Id. at 1628. 
241 Id. 
248 Id. at 1627. 
249 Id. 
250 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (distinguishing other "ordinary" cases where rational 
basis test was met). 
251 Id. 
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3. Application to the LSC Case 
The LSC restrictions were motivated by precisely the kind of invidi-
ous bias that Moreno, Cleburne Living Center, and Romer pronounce 
illegitimate. Viewed in light of their legislative history, there is no ques-
tion that the restrictions represent an attempt to cut off unpopular view-
points and to silence the trouble-making poor. Congressional debate on 
the restrictions revealed an intense dislike on the part of several Members 
for the types of cases brought by LSC lawyers, particularly those that 
could be described as "liberal."252 New York State Justice Beverly Cohen 
noted in her opinion striking down the restrictions that the legislative 
history "reveals that the actual state interest in passing the legislation was 
a blatant attempt to inhibit the First Amendment rights of LSC lawyers, 
their clients, and anyone who agrees with them. The restrictions were 
designed to minimize, if not prevent, the political impact of the causes of 
the poor and their champions."253 As in Cleburne Living Center, the LSC 
restrictions reflect desires on the part of Congress not to hear from the 
poor and not to be disturbed by their presence. 
In its court papers defending the restrictions, the government has 
relied on Rust v. Sullivan to assert its right not to "subsidize certain 
activities," and to exercise "control over programs it creates and subsi-
dizes."254 No other state interest has been represented. Under Rust, the 
government argues, Congress can choose which activities it wishes to 
fund, and which it wishes to exclude. According to the defenders of the 
restrictions, Congress's wish to "restore the LSC to its original focus on 
the bread and butter needs of the poor"255 is a legitimate rationale for 
removing class actions and other types of political action from the pur-
view of LSC recipients. 
As discussed in Part II supra, however, Rust may not be controlling 
in this case. Insofar as the provision of legal services is significantly 
different from the provision of family planning services, the former in-
herently implicating core First Amendment rights, the restrictions may not 
be constitutionally or statutorily permissible even if the state's asserted 
interests are taken at face value. 
252 See 142 CONG. REC. H8185 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doman). 
Representative Doman declared, "It's time to defund the left . . . . " Id. at H8 I 85. 
253 Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 
1996). 
254 Govemment's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and for Class Certification at 13, Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., (No. 97 CV 
00182) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997). 
255 Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (No. 97 CV 00182) (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 21, 1997). 
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However, once the state's asserted interests are closely examined, 
these interests become even more suspect. As in Romer, the restrictions 
are at once too broad and too narrow to achieve their stated goals. In an 
alleged effort to stop what it considers frivolous or non-essential litigation 
and political activity, Congress has denied a wide panoply of legal tools 
across the board to LSC recipients. Rather than, for example, requiring 
recipients to certify that there is a good faith basis for all actions under-
taken, Congress has substituted its own judgment that, in all cases, class 
actions and political activity will never be the most effective or efficient 
means available. 256 
The restrictions are both too broad and too narrow. They deny effec-
tive relief where the excluded activities might in fact be the most effective 
means to address the "bread and butter needs" of poor people, and they 
are too narrow because they fail to address instances of abuse where none 
of the excluded tools are utilized. Such a discrepancy between the asserted 
goals and the actual effect of the restrictions suggests that Congress was 
not concerned about refocusing the LSC on the basic needs of the poor. 
Rather, the lack of fit suggests that Congress was attempting to suppress 
a distinctive political agenda, espoused by many LSC lawyers and their 
clients. As Moreno, Cleburne Living Center, and Romer instruct, such 
bare dislike for an unpopular group is an impermissible basis for a legis-
lative classification, even if the government is under no general obligation 
to provide the benefit in question.257 
256 As two observers of the ongoing Congressional effort to limit the activities of LSC 
lawyers have noted: "If the Legal Services lawyers act improperly, the local program, the 
court, and the LSC all have sanction mechanisms." Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, 
Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. l, 
55 (1984). In light of such existing sanction mechanisms, the broad-based exclusions 
included in the 1996 restrictions are difficult to justify on the grounds that they will 
prevent abusive lawyering. 
257 As Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, recognized in Cornelius 
v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788 (1985), a significantmisfit between the state's asserted goals and 
its actions can give rise to an inference that the state has misrepresented its actual 
purposes. In Cornelius, certain organizations including the NAACP had been excluded 
from participation in the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a federal program for 
charitable giving open to all federal workers. Although the government asserted that it had 
excluded all advocacy organizations in order to avoid controversy, and that it had included 
only those organizations that provided direct health and welfare services, the Court noted 
that other organizations that did not provide such direct services had been included. The 
Court found that this discrepancy "cast doubt" on the genuineness of the government's 
asserted objectives, and invited the plaintiff organizations to develop on remand their 
argument that their exclusion "was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a 
particular point of view." Id. at 812-13. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S . 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); and Martin v. 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (all finding underinclusiveness indicative of an impermis-
sible motive). 
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B. The Restrictions Impinge upon LSC's Clients' Fundamental Right of 
Access to the Courts 
In addition to representing an invidious bias against the poor, the restric-
tions are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause because they impinge 
upon LSC clients' fundamental right of access to the courts.258 Access to 
the courts is not only fundamental as a First Amendment right, but also 
as a right preservative of all other rights. 259 If the poor do not have access 
to the courts to enforce rights obtained in the legislative arena, those 
rights are effectively meaningless. More importantly, in light of the in-
vidious bias cases, if legislative acts violate the constitutional rights of 
the poor, access to the court may provide the only means of redress. 
As Justice Stone wrote in his famous footnote 4 to United States v. 
Carolene Products,26() "searching judicial inquiry" may be appropriate 
where a regulation "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."261 
258 Which rights are fundamental for the purposes of equal protection analysis are 
hardly fixed and precise. Statutory schemes impinging upon the right of poor people to 
travel, vote, or obtain a divorce, for example, have been invalidated as denials of equal 
protection on the grounds that these rights, among others, are fundamental. See Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating law impinging on access to the courts to 
obtain a divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (addressing right to travel); 
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia law 
imposing $1.50 poll tax). Although the Court has offered various formulations for 
determining whether a right is fundamental , no single definition has emerged as determi-
native. See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S . at 374 (suggesting that the relevant inquiry is whether 
the state has monopolized enforcement of a particular right); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (suggesting that the relevant question is whether it would be possible 
to imagine a "scheme of ordered liberty" without recognition of the right at issue as 
fundamental) . See also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access 
Fees: The Right to Protect One 's Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1178-80 (discussing 
the ambiguity in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on which rights are fundamental); Ira 
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 , 
1007-08 (1979) (same). 
259 The notion of preservative rights was introduced in reference to voting in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) and developed in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
562 (1964). Moreover, as the Button Court recognized, access to the courts will be 
critically important for those groups "unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot." 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). Frank I. Michelman has written about the 
connection between access to courts and the ballot: 
[L]itigation and legislation . . . [are] bound up with one another in an entire, 
political-legal order in which the court's part is no less critical than the legisla-
ture's . . . . Access to the courts and access to legislatures are [thus] claims that 
merge into one another, .. . [and one] cannot, without confusion, call a person 
a citizen and at the same time sanction . . . [his] exclusion . . . from that process. 
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect 
One 's Rights (pt. 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 534-40. 
260 304 U.S. 144 (1938) . 
261 /d. at 153 n.4. 
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Although the poor are not the kind of "discrete and insular minority"262 
contemplated by Justice Stone, legislative actions that threaten to under-
mine fatally the capacity of the poor or other non-suspect classes to 
participate in the ·political processes have nevertheless been consistently 
struck down. 
The Court's poll tax and voting cases, for example, established that 
the right to vote may not be conditioned on the basis of wealth.263 Simi-
larly, the Court's ballot access and filing fee cases have held that a state 
may not make it virtually impossible for new political parties to be placed 
on the ballot, 264 or for poor people to run for office. 265 The logic of these 
decisions reflects both a concern for the legitimacy of our political de-
mocracy and for the rights of minorities who are threatened with utter 
disempowerment. As Justice Warren noted in Kramer v. Union Free School 
District, "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may par-
ticipate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials under-
mines the legitimacy of representative government."266 Moreover, "[s]tatutes 
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the 
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental 
affairs which substantially affect their lives."267 
Although it was not explicit, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer, 
relied heavily on the Court's fundamental or preservative rights jurispru-
dence. In addition to finding that Colorado's Amendment 2 was motivated 
by invidious bias against homosexuals, the Court concluded that the ref-
erendum had the peculiar effect of making it "more difficult for one group 
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government."268 
262 Id. 
263 See Phoenix v. Kolodziej ski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating Phoenix law 
limiting the vote on the issuance of general obligation bonds to property-owning taxpay-
ers); Cipriano v. City of Houston, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (invalidating Louisiana law 
extending the vote on municipal utility bonds issuance to property-owning taxpayers); 
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. , 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating New York statute 
restricting voting in school district elections to those residents who owned or leased 
taxable real property in the district or had a child enrolled in the local school); Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia law imposing 
a $1.50 poll tax). 
264 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 25 (1968) (invalidating Ohio law making it 
"virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republican and 
Democratic Parties"). Cf Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Ameri-
can Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding state ballot access scheme); 
Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971) (upholding Georgia law placing some 
additional burdens on new parties because in total , the state's ballot access scheme "in no 
way freezes the status quo"). 
265 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S . 709 (1974) (invalidating, as applied to indigents, 
California law requiring candidates for office to pay a filing fee equivalent to two percent 
of the annual salary of that office) ; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating 
filing fee shifting costs of primary to candidates) . 
266 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (1969). 
267 Id. at 626- 27 (emphasis added). 
268 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996). 
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This singling out of a disfavored group for differential treatment 
represented "a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal 
sense," 269 because it imposed burdens on homosexuals shared by no other 
group of citizens. While other groups seeking protection from discrimi-
nation would need only petition the legislature for more favorable laws 
(if they did not already enjoy such statutory protection), homosexuals 
would face the additional burden of having first to succeed in passing a 
state referendum repealing Amendment 2. 
The Court held that Colorado could not take such a dramatic step to 
make homosexuals, as a class, "stranger[s] to its laws," and thereby 
"unequal to everyone else."27° Citing Justice Harlan 's dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,211 the Court stated that "the Constitution neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens."272 Because the Colorado referendum 
effectively created classes among citizens, not simply in the suspect class 
sense, but in the "caste" sense described in Plessy,213 it was impermissible. 
The referendum created a caste system by setting up rigid political barri-
ers to one group's ability to enjoy the protections of law on an equal basis 
with other groups. These barriers would perpetuate the inequality of that 
group's status based on a single disfavored characteristic.274 
The LSC restrictions operate in a manner analogous to the restric-
tions in Cleburne Living Center and Romer because they go to the heart 
of the First Amendment rights of the poor and their ability to participate 
in the political-legal order.275 Similarly, in United States v. Button, the 
Court struck down restrictions that prevented blacks from exercising what 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 1629. 
21 1 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
272 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
273 Justice Harlan noted in his dissent to Plessy: "[I]n view of the Constitution, in the 
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There 
is no caste here." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 
274 Sunstein captured the two related ways in which Colorado's Amendment 2 tended 
to create a caste system based on sexual orientation. First, the Amendment reflected "a 
desire to isolate and seal off members of a despised group whose characteristics are 
thought to be in some sense contaminating or corrosive." Sunstein, supra note 237, at 62. 
In other words, Amendment 2 created a symbolic wall around homosexuals, giving legal 
imprimatur to the presumably straight majority of voters' wish to designate homosexuals 
as "other." This wish to seal off an undesirable group was similarly responsible, in the 
Court's opinion, for the City of Clebume's effort to prevent the mentally retarded from 
entering their community. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985). 
The second sense in which Amendment 2 attempted to establish a caste system was 
in its creation of a "second-class citizenship" for homosexuals whereby it would be more 
difficult for homosexuals than for any other group to obtain the protection of the laws. 
See Sunstein, supra note 237, at 63 . 
275 Cf Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 600 (1994) ("Winning the battle in the courts rather than in the 
legislatures does not violate democratic principles because the courts are intervening on 
behalf of groups that are under-represented in the legislatures.") (summarizing DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)). 
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was likely to be their most effective form of political expression. While 
the LSC restrictions leave the private bar free to take up class actions and 
political activity on behalf of the poor, the restrictions are likely to 
diminish the total volume of such cases and activities.276 Moreover, the 
inability of LSC recipients to initiate class actions threatens to undermine 
the effectiveness both of their representation of individual clients and of 
the class actions that are ultimately brought by separate counsel. 277 By 
dispersing clients among private lawyers and non-LSC organizations, the 
restrictions take away the primary advantages the poor once had: LSC 
lawyers' expertise in the needs of the poor and their ideal positioning to 
know when a problem had risen to a "class" dimension.278 
Thus, like Colorado's Amendment 2, the LSC restrictions make it 
more difficult for the poor to obtain effective redress for their grievances. 
276 To date, there is no data by which to judge the actual effect of the restrictions on 
the number of class actions and other actions taken on behalf of the poor. Existing studies 
of the pro bono activities of private lawyers suggest that "although most lawyers donate 
some free services, little of it involves the representation of indigents." Cramton, supra 
note 275 , at 578 n.121. 
277 On the importance of class actions for effective individual as well as group 
representation, see Failinger & May, supra note 256, at 17. Failinger and May argue: 
[T]he fact is that group representation devices such as class actions are often the 
most effective way of representing an individual poor person . . . . The individual 
lawsuit, which may restore some of the economic benefits lost by the poor person, 
cannot remedy past and future harassment or restore the political balance of 
power between the institution and the individual. By contrast, the class suit can 
secure relief for the client that is not only longer-lasting but also broader-based. 
Additionally, the publicity accompanying the class suit places more of a burden 
on the welfare official to explain his or her conduct to supervisors and members 
of the public . . . . 
Id. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (recognizing that class 
actions "may enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine 
their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture"). 
278 Although no comprehensive list of major LSC victories exists, many of this 
century's most important cases leading to an expansion of the rights of the poor were 
brought by LSC lawyers. Notable cases brought by LSC lawyers include Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that the right to divorce is fundamental) ; 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that recipients of public assistance have 
a right to a hearing prior to the termination of benefits); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that the right to travel is fundamental). See Allen Redlich, A 
New Legal Services Agenda, 57 ALB. L. REV. 169, 169 n.4 (1993). The fact that such 
important cases were brought by LSC lawyers suggests that specialization in poverty law 
does add value to the service LSC lawyers are able to provide their indigent clients. See 
Cramton, supra note 275, at 590. Cramton writes: 
[T]he staff-attorney system [of legal services for the poor, in contrast with a 
system which refers poor persons to members of the private bar] provides a cadre 
of lawyers who are intellectually and personally committed to serving the poor. 
The delivery of services may be organized so that clients are served by experi-
enced specialists in various areas of poverty law, such as welfare, housing, or 
education. Further, the staff-attorney system permits more aggressive pursuit of 
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They are free to seek private representation in matters forbidden to LSC-
grantees, just as homosexuals in Colorado would have been free to seek 
vindication of their rights by campaigning for the repeal of Amendment 
2. But at some point, the Supreme Court has said, the albatross placed 
around the neck of a disfavored group, even if it is not a suspect class, 
grows too large and offends our sense of fairness. While individuals with 
sufficient resources may hire only one lawyer, impoverished clients must 
seek the assistance of several lawyers to obtain effective relief. Yet, the 
lawyers most likely to assist them in an effective manner have been placed 
off limits. 
The chilling of class actions and political activity that the restrictions 
cause is particularly alarming because the doctrine of offensive collateral 
estoppel does not apply to the federal government. In United States v. 
Mendoza, 219 the Supreme Court held that "the United States may not be 
collaterally estopped on an issue such as this, adjudicated against it in an 
earlier lawsuit brought by a different party."280 In Mendoza, a Filipino 
national had applied for naturalization, building his case in part around a 
constitutional challenge to the government's administration of the Nation-
ality Act. This issue had been previously decided against the government 
in a case brought by another Filipino national. 
The Court found that the government could not be estopped from 
relitigating the issue. "[B]ecause of the geographic breadth of Govern-
ment litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the 
issues the Government litigates,"281 the Court held that estoppel was in-
appropriate. The Court suggested a variety of policy reasons, including 
concerns about "thwart[ing] the development of important questions of 
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal 
issue."282 The Court declared that the government is simply "[u]nlike a 
private litigant."283 
Mendoza thus prevents an individual challenging a federal statute, 
policy, or regulation from relying on a previous decision. Any person not 
party to the previous decision must relitigate the issue, no matter how 
many times a court has already decided a similar issue in their favor. 
Under Mendoza, therefore, class actions may not only be the most efficient 
Id. 
institutional reform that benefits groups of poor people rather than merely an 
individual client. 
279 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
280 Id. at 155. Cf United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169 (1984) 
(holding that the government could be precluded from relitigating an issue "already 
litigated against the same party in another case involving virtually identical facts") . 
281 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159. 
282 Id. at 160. 
283 Id. at 161. 
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and effective way to obtain relief for individuals with grievances against 
the federal government, they may be essential. In a world of limited 
resources, relitigating the same issue against the government is simply 
impracticable. Mendoza thus creates enormous incentives for similarly 
situated individuals to join as a class; if they are not party to the initial 
litigation they may never obtain relief. Viewed in this light, the prohibition 
on class actions seems particularly insidious, and the restrictions on lob-
bying and political activity deliver the final blow for real change. 284 As 
Judge Cohen noted in Varshavsky: "The ostensible goal of saving money 
will not be accomplished by relegating the poor to less efficient individual 
actions for the same relief."285 The goal of silencing disfavored views of 
"unpopular individuals,"286 however, will be accomplished quite effec-
tively. 
Conclusion 
The history of the Legal Services Corporation reflects recurrent good 
and bad impulses in our society. Created in a gesture of optimism about 
the potential for legal representation to improve the lot of the poor, since 
its inception the LSC has been weighed down by restrictions, reflective 
of the cultural wars of the day, which have undermined the ability of LSC 
grantees to provide uncompromised legal services to their clients. These 
restrictions generally have been enacted to placate opponents of the LSC 
who, if they cannot defeat the Corporation entirely, are mollified by the 
knowledge that it will undertake only "ham and eggs" work for poor 
people. In addition, these restrictions have generally reflected a desire to 
defund "liberal" causes, loosely defined as any unpopular effort on behalf 
of the least favored in our society. While the 1996 restrictions specifically 
284 As Allen Redlich has noted: 
[T]he need to provide a full range of quality legal services cannot be overstated. 
Just as aspirin tablets and band-aids are not solutions to serious diseases and 
serious injuries, steering the poor through the system and helping the cliem get 
only what the system will allow is not a solution to poverty .... Whether the 
legal services programs of America can increase the number of legal aspirin 
tablets and band-aids they dispense is in the long run meaningless, unless the 
programs have the ability and determination to do more. To ensure the poor 
"access" to the legal system while limiting the ability of their lawyers to use the 
law in a meaningful manner may make lawyers feel good about themselves and 
the legal system, but, like a medical facility that dispenses only aspirin, this type 
of program is of little societal value. 
Redlich, supra note 278, at 174-75. 
285 Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996). 
286 142 CONG. REC. H8182 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schiff) 
(responding to the assertion by colleagues that "unpopular individuals have brought 
unpopular lawsuits through the Legal Aid Society"). 
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target illegal aliens, drug users, and prisoners, prior restrictions have 
prohibited the representation of military deserters and those seeking an 
abortion, desegregation, or redistricting. A 1977 attempt to cut off LSC 
funding for representation of homosexuals is notable not for its blatantly 
discriminatory purpose, but rather for the fact that it failed. 287 
A consistent theme behind the restrictions imposed on the LSC over 
its life is that of Congress trying to control the classes of people that will 
receive assistance for reasons unrelated to financial need or ability to 
benefit from legal representation. The 1996 restrictions are merely the 
latest wave in this effort; nevertheless, they are notable insofar as they 
are the most sweeping to date, and they are the first to categorically place 
all political activity beyond the scope of LSC lawyers. If ever there was 
a time to make the case that the restrictions amount to impermissible 
discrimination on the basis of the content of First Amendment activity, it 
is now. As this Article has argued, Rust v. Sullivan need not be an impediment 
to such a challenge. Other constitutional principles, such as the prohibi-
tion on content discrimination and the Court's public forum jurisprudence, 
provide avenues by which to distinguish Rust. 
For the poor person in our society, the need for an effective and 
independent lawyer is particularly strong. Without such representation, the 
poor will not be able to exercise their fundamental right of access to the 
courts, a right all the more important where other means of participation 
in the political-legal order are effectively unavailable. The right to uncom-
promised legal services is properly viewed as preservative of all other 
rights for the LSC population, and should not be taken away lightly. 
Although the current political climate favors the conditioning of public 
assistance on a recipient's willingness to work or ability to meet other 
requirements, this Article attempts to demonstrate how the provision of 
legal services is qualitatively different from other types of public assis-
tance. Without expressing a view on the moral or constitutional legitimacy 
of recent revisions to the welfare system, this Article has suggested that 
restrictions on legal services are uniquely corrosive of cherished consti-
tutional freedoms and of the health and legitimacy of our democracy. 
Thus, while current law does not require any public support for civil legal 
services for the indigent, fairness and current law dictate that if such 
services are provided, restrictions imposed on them may not discriminate 
on the basis of viewpoint or fatally undermine the efforts of lawyers 
seeking relief for their clients. 
287 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-825 at 16 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4530, 4537 (reporting a legislative history of the Legal Services Corporation Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977). It reads : "Gay rights cases: The 
House bill prohibits legal assistance with respect to any proceeding or litigation arising 
out of disputes or controversies on the issue of homosexuality or 'so-called gay rights'."). 
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At the time of this Article's completion, the 1997 budget battle is in 
its intermediate stages. The LSC again faces major cuts, as Congressional 
foes resurrect their enthusiasm for defunding it. 288 Those LSC lawyers 
who said there was no deal in 1996 to save the Corporation appear to 
have been correct. 289 The restrictions have not insulated the LSC from 
continued assault. Regardless of the eventual budget for the LSC in the 
coming year, the 1996 restrictions promise to remain in effect until they 
are successfully challenged in court. This Article provides the groundwork 
for such a challenge, a challenge that, of course, must be brought by 
lawyers who are outside the Legal Services Corporation and therefore are 
not subject to its restrictions. 
288 See Jerry Gray, In Spending Bill, Gauntlet on Census is Thrown Down, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. l, 1997, at A23 ( describing the tentative 1998 budget for the LSC as half of its 1997 
budget). See also Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton and Congress in Accord On Budget, 
Except for Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1997, at Al (describing the earlier tentative 
budget agreement reached between the White House and Congressional negotiators). 
289 See supra note 23 . 
